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Over the last twenty years, immigration unquestionably has emerged as a hot 
button issue in the American culture wars. It currently ranks up there with 
abortion, gay marriage, and guns as a divisive topic of national debate. Along these 
lines, the nation’s first African-American President, Barack Obama—himself 
challenged by a distinct but vocal minority of Americans as a foreigner not born 
on American soil1—has been accused by immigration extremists of failing to 
 
1. The claim of this vocal minority is that President Obama is not eligible for the Presidency 
because the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of 
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. President Obama’s eligibility for the presidency has been 
repeatedly challenged on the grounds that, despite public records showing that he was born in Hawaii, 
he allegedly was born outside of the United States. See Dana Milbank, President Alien, and Other Tales 
From the Fringe, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2008, at A3; Frank Rich, Op-Ed., The Obama Haters’ Silent 
Enablers, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2009, at 8. There is even a website devoted to the so-called birther 
movement, see THE BIRTHERS, http://www.birthers.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2011), to which 
CNN’s Lou Dobbs gave mainstream credence on his prime-time show before his abrupt departure in 
late 2009. See Michael Shain & David K. Li, Dobbs Gave Up on $9M, N.Y. POST, Nov. 13, 2009, at 15. 
 Besides being alleged to be a foreigner, President Obama has been claimed to be Muslim, even 
though he emphatically states that he is a Christian. See Angie Drobnic Holan, Fact: Obama Isn’t a 
Muslim, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at A1 (“The Pew Research Center last week reported 
that 18 percent of Americans believe Obama is a Muslim, up from 11 percent in March 2009. A Time 
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enforce the U.S. immigration laws and, in fact, secretly plotting to grant a much-
maligned “amnesty”2 to millions of undocumented immigrants. One can only 
wonder why the immigration debate has become so heated and, at times, can best 
be described as nothing less than vicious. This Article offers some insights into 
why that is the case. 
Let us begin with an examination of the modern debate over immigration in 
the United States. In this country, immigration laws readily provide color-blind, 
facially neutral proxies that are often conveniently employed by groups that, 
among other things, seek to target persons of particular races and classes, 
specifically working class Latina/os, for immigration investigation, enforcement, 
and prosecution. To make matters worse, the terms employed in the heated 
rhetoric of the immigration debate facilitate superficially coded discussions of race 
and civil rights, without the need to squarely confront the “sticky mess of race” 
and racism in American social life.3 
As a matter of fact, the U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement have 
distinctly disparate racial impacts on people of color both inside and outside the 
United States.4 Indeed, immigration law, by permitting the unfavorable treatment 
of noncitizens—a convenient, albeit imperfect, proxy for race—allows for racial 
discrimination in the aggregate, without the need for the express (and 
delegitimizing) reliance on race, on a massive scale.5 One might even view the 
enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws as a facially neutral—and thus 
presumably legal and legitimate—form of racial discrimination.  
This Article develops the theme that U.S. immigration law allows for coded, 
and thus more legitimate, arguments in favor of racial discrimination as well as for 
the pursuit of immigration law and policies with as extreme a set of racially 
disparate consequences as can be found in American law. Such arguments find 
legitimacy in the public discourse because they highlight notions of racial 
neutrality, color-blindness, and the moral call for obedience to the rule of law. 
 
magazine poll also released last week found even more people—24 percent—said he was a Muslim.”). 
Combined with his race and alleged foreigner status, misconceptions about President Obama’s 
religion contribute to the views among some that he is an illegitimate outsider. See Samuel G. 
Freedman, In Untruths About Obama, Echoes of a Distant Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at A21. 
2. See infra text accompanying notes 132–35 (discussing intense public controversy over 
proposals for an “amnesty” of undocumented immigrants).  
3. Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—LatCrit Theory and the 
Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585 (1997); see Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The 
Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAW & INEQ. 7, 23 (1997) (“The real world is messy with no clear 
answers. Nothing demonstrates this convolution better than the social construction of racial and 
ethnic categories.”). 
4. See infra Parts I, II. 
5. For analysis of the general concept of racial discrimination by proxy as well as the 
application of the concept to a California law banning bilingual education, see Kevin R. Johnson & 
George A. Martínez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 
33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227 (2000). 
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In this regard, the color-blind, pro-law enforcement approach6 to the debate 
over immigration serves a noteworthy legitimating function. That approach 
provides plausible deniability to accusations of racism for advocates of 
immigration positions with blatantly discriminatory impacts. One glaring example 
is the law passed by the Arizona legislature in 2010 that was designed to address 
the state’s perceived immigration crisis. Opponents of comprehensive 
immigration reform also seek to achieve racially disparate ends through facially 
neutral measures.7 When the color-blind approach prevails, it effectively assists in 
ensuring racially disparate impacts of the operation of the immigration laws.8 
Part I of the Article offers an analysis of the deficiencies of the state of 
Arizona’s controversial endeavor to participate in immigration enforcement, as 
well as a study of the current debate over immigration reform. In so doing, this 
Part explains how, given the racial demographics of immigration to the United 
States today, debates over laws permitting discrimination based on a person’s 
immigration status allow for coded discussions about race and the civil rights of 
immigrants and people of color generally. 
Part II of the Article analyzes the most obvious racially disparate impacts of 
the failure of comprehensive immigration reform, as well as the less visible racially 
disparate impacts of the failure of Congress to act now on immigration. It further 
spells out how the failure to reform the U.S. immigration laws, although facially 
neutral, will injure people of color both inside and outside the United States. 
One might wonder why race, even though it may animate the positions 
advocated by some restrictionists, tends to be buried in the modern debate about 
immigration. The answer is relatively simple. Times unquestionably have changed, 
though perhaps not as much as suggested by those who assert that the election of 
a Black President marks the beginning of a new postracial America. In contrast to 
the heyday of Jim Crow, today people in polite company rarely contend that racial 
discrimination in the immigration laws—or in law generally—can be justified by 
 
6. For a general critique of the color-blind approach to remedying the vestiges of racial 
discrimination in American social life and the argument that “the United State Supreme Court’s use of 
color-blind constitutionalism—a collection of legal themes functioning as racial ideology—fosters 
white racial domination,” see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1991); see also Tucker Culbertson, Another Genealogy of Equality: Further Arguments Against the 
Moral-Politics of Colorblind Constitutionalism, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 51, 53–54 (2008) (criticizing the 
theory of the color-blind Constitution as a denial of the pervasive and complex effects of race in U.S. 
history); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Parents Involved and the Myth of the Colorblind Constitution, 26 HARV. J. 
ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 211 (2010) (discussing critically the color-blind analysis of Parents 
Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)); Julian Wonjung Park, Comment, A More 
Meaningful Citizenship Test? Unmasking the Construction of a Universalist, Principle-Based Citizenship Ideology, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 999, 1025 (2008) (criticizing the theory of color-blindness for ignoring, rather than 
confronting, issues of race and racial discrimination). 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. See infra Part II. 
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the biological or innate inferiority of people of color.9 Indeed, the demise of Jim 
Crow, combined with the civil rights movement, contributed to the removal of the 
most blatant forms of racial discrimination from the U.S. immigration laws in 
1965.10 However, racism still exists in the modern United States and in recent 
years has arguably been transferred or displaced from domestic minorities to 
immigrants of color.11 
It often is argued that immigrants, especially those who are “illegal aliens,” 
warrant discriminatory treatment, punishment, and little sympathy because of their 
unlawful immigration status. An often accompanying argument is that race has 
nothing to do with the desire to make distinctions on the basis of immigration 
status. Rather, it is only a desire to “enforce the law” and “secure the borders.” 
The harsh treatment of immigrants has disparate racial impacts. However, this 
treatment is not expressly justified by discredited notions of racial inferiority, 
which certainly would bring out in force those committed to civil rights. 
In the end, what does this all mean? In the modern United States, the debate 
over immigration ultimately functions as a convenient and legitimate forum for 
people to vent racial antipathy and frustrations, whether it be about new groups of 
people in the neighborhood, shifting population demographics and changing 
political power, languages other than English being spoken in public places, the 
decline in the economy (and resulting loss of jobs), the poor quality of the public 
schools, health care reform, the fact that workers congregate on street corners, or 
virtually anything and everything. 
I. THE TUMULTUOUS IMMIGRATION DEBATE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Many Americans, like the White House, believe that the current U.S. 
immigration system is nothing less than “broken.”12 Consequently, for most of the 
twenty-first century, Congress has debated what has come to be characterized as 
 
9. For example, Samuel Huntington, in lamenting the “Hispanization” of immigration, 
contends that it is the inferior non-Anglo culture of today’s immigrants, not their race, which justifies 
severe restrictions on immigration of Hispanics to the United States. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, 
WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 221–46 (2004). For a stern 
rebuttal to Huntington, see Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural 
Nation: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347 (2005).  
10. For discussion of the Immigration Act of 1965 and its impacts on the demographics of 
modern immigration, see Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Gabriel J. 
Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996). 
11. For elaboration on this theory, see Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and 
Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1148–58 (1998). 
12. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
comprehensive-immigration-reform. 
Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:36 PM 
318 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:313 
 
“comprehensive immigration reform,”13 although the many reform proposals out 
there in fact vary widely.14 A more general, and often overheated, debate over 
immigration continues to rage on a daily basis in cities and towns across the 
United States.15 Unfortunately, the public debate is not always conducted at a 
particularly—some might claim minimally—sophisticated level.16 
Supporters of increased immigration enforcement of many different varieties 
often insist—and vigorously protest any claims to the contrary—that they are not 
the least bit anti-immigrant, anti-Mexican, or racist. Rather they contend that they 
simply are anti-“illegal” immigrant.17 This claim is frequently buttressed with the 
 
13. See infra text accompanying notes 125–28 (discussing the common components of many 
comprehensive immigration reform proposals). For analysis of various immigration reform proposals 
and their failure, see MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., “COMPREHENSIVE” 
LEGISLATION VS. FUNDAMENTAL REFORM: THE LIMITS OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION PROPOSALS 
(2006) (analyzing critically then-current immigration reform proposals); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Administrative Law: Immigration, Amnesty, and the Rule of Law, 2007 National Lawyers Convention of the 
Federalist Society, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2008) (observing that reform proposals had failed 
to come up with a reliable way to reduce undocumented migration to the United States); Muzaffar 
Chishti, A Redesigned Immigration Selection System, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115 (2008) (proposing a 
redesign of the contemporary U.S. immigration system); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Can’t Live With 
‘Em, Can’t Deport ‘Em: Why Recent Immigration Reform Efforts Have Failed, 13 NEXUS 13 (2008) 
(analyzing reasons for failure of immigration reform proposals); Robert Gittelson, The Centrists Against 
the Ideologues: What Are the Falsehoods that Divide Americans on the Issue of Comprehensive Immigration Reform?, 
23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2009) (identifying factors contributing to the 
divisiveness of immigration reform debate); Katherine L. Vaughns, Restoring the Rule of Law: Reflections 
on Fixing the Immigration System and Exploring Failed Policy Choices, 5 U. MD. J. RACE RELIGION GENDER 
& CLASS 151 (2005) (offering thoughts on improving the current U.S. immigration system). For a 
capsule summary of the myriad immigration reform proposals floated in Congress in just the last few 
years, see BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS: VALUES, MORALITY, AND IMMIGRATION 
POLICY 17–38 (2006). 
14. For a summary of some of the commonalities of comprehensive immigration reform 
proposals, see infra text accompanying notes 128–31. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 24–55. 
16. See Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate over Immigration 
Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. 
L. REV. 583 (2010) (analyzing the hyperbolic, and counterproductive, rhetoric all too common in the 
modern debate over immigration in the United States). 
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Downes, What Part of “Illegal” Don’t You Understand?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 2007, at C11 (“Meanwhile, out on the edges of the debate—edges that are coming closer to the 
mainstream every day—bigots pour all their loathing of Spanish-speaking people into the word 
[illegal]. Rant about ‘illegals’—call them congenital criminals, lepers, thieves, unclean—and people 
will nod and applaud. They will send money to your Web site and heed your calls to deluge lawmakers 
with phone calls and faxes. Your TV ratings will go way up.”); Ruben Navarrette Jr., No Such Thing as 
a Good Immigrant, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 29, 2006, at B7 (“Most Republicans in Congress 
insist they’re not anti-immigrant. . . . They and their political posse have insisted all along that—in 
what has become a convenient sound bite—they aren’t anti-immigrant, only anti-illegal immigration. 
In fact, [then-CNN’s] Lou Dobbs said exactly that on his show . . . in response to viewer mail that 
accused him of being anti-immigrant.”). While hosting a CNN nightly show, Dobbs regularly denied 
that his attacks on immigrants were racist or anti-Mexican. See Rachel L. Swarns, Dobbs’s Outspokenness 
Draws Fans and Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at E1. 
 Historically, race and civil rights often have been slightly below the surface of the clamor for 
tougher enforcement of the criminal laws. See Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-coding” Colorblind 
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all-too-common rebuke to any suggested reform that arguably benefits 
undocumented immigrants or even to the minimalist claim that they have rights: 
“What part of illegal don’t you understand?”18 Although ostensibly framed as a 
question, this statement more often than not is intended to cut off, not 
commence, any serious discussion of the complexities of immigration law and its 
enforcement. On the other hand, proponents of more generous immigration rules 
at times have been perhaps too eager to play the “race card” and quickly dismiss 
and disregard any and all claims of the proenforcement crowd as “racist” and 
“nativist.”19 Each approach effectively ends serious, and much-needed, discussion 
and debate over reform of the immigration laws. 
If nothing else, one thing is crystal clear in the modern debate over 
immigration in the United States. Latina/os, a group that has grown dramatically 
as a percentage of the overall U.S. population (and as a political force) over the 
last fifty years, have strenuously advocated for immigration reform and support 
reform by a wide margin.20 This has been relatively constant over time and seems 
unlikely to change in the immediate future. 
The reason for the decidedly proreform tilt among Latina/os is pretty 
straightforward. The enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws disparately affects 
Latina/os, U.S. citizens as well as immigrants and potential immigrants.21 Many 
Latina/os would benefit from the comprehensive immigration reform proposals 
currently being contemplated. Conversely, many Latina/os would be negatively 
affected by the failure of Congress to enact immigration reform legislation.22  
This Part of the Article considers recent developments on the immigration 
front lines. These developments tell volumes about the true meaning and impacts 
of the facially neutral, generally raceless and color-blind debate over the U.S. 
immigration laws and their reform. Despite strongly asserted claims of racial 
neutrality by those who ostensibly seek to simply “enforce the law” or “secure our 
 
Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 626–27 (2000); see also 
Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the “Down Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential 
Campaigns, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 312–14 (2009) (reviewing examples of coded 
racial appeals in modern presidential campaigns, including Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” 
Ronald Reagan’s reference to “welfare queens,” see infra note 60, and George Bush’s Willie Horton 
television advertisements, which suggested that his Democratic opponent had released a violent Black 
criminal from prison). 
18. See, e.g., Editorial, Suing Arizona, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A16 (“Immigration foes don’t 
believe the government has any interest in halting illegal immigration and have responded to U.S. 
policy with simplistic slogans such as ‘What part of illegal don’t you understand?’ and ‘Illegal is a 
crime.’”). 
19. This is not to suggest that racism and nativism do not influence the immigration debate. 
They unquestionably do. See infra note 23 (citing authorities) and accompanying text. 
20. See Poll: Latinos View Immigration, Economy as Top Concerns, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE 
PRESS (Tenn.), July 15, 2010, at A4. 
21. See Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson, Latinos and the Law: Cases and Materials: The Need for 
Focus in Critical Analysis, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 73, 95–100 (2009).  
22. See infra Parts I.B, II. 
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borders,” the immigration laws in question are replete with racially disparate 
consequences and outcomes.23 Consequently, actions that call for changes to 
immigration law and enforcement will have discrete, visible, and unquestionable 
racial consequences. Although often ignored in the vigorous ongoing debate, 
failure to reform the immigration laws would have disparate racial consequences 
as well.  
A. Meltdown in the Desert: Arizona’s S.B. 1070 
In the last few years, a growing—indeed, unprecedented—number of state 
and local governments have adopted harsh measures that target undocumented 
immigrants for punishment, such as prohibiting rental of properties to 
undocumented immigrants, enhancing punishments for the employment of 
undocumented immigrants, and similar measures.24 One reason for the vigor of 
those efforts is the changing distribution of immigrants across the United States, 
which has contributed to increasing uneasiness over the real and imagined changes 
brought by new immigrants to their communities. In addition, state and local 
governments are passing the immigration measures in response to frustration over 
the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform. 
 
23. For critical analysis of the role of race in the history of the U.S. immigration laws through 
to modern times, see Johnson, supra note 11. See also Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion 
and Nationality in Immigration Selection: 120 Years After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 
237 (2010). On the need for legal scholarship to investigate more closely the salience of race to the 
formation and enforcement of immigration law, see Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship 
Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493 (2007); Kevin 
R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal 
Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (2000). 
 For a contemporary review of patterns of nativism in U.S. immigration history, see PETER 
SCHRAG, NOT FIT FOR OUR SOCIETY (2010). See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860–1925 (3d ed. 1994) (analyzing political history 
surrounding congressional passage in 1924 of the national-origins quotas system, which remained an 
integral part of U.S. immigration laws until 1965); BILL ONG HING, MAKING & REMAKING ASIAN 
AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1850–1990 (1993) (documenting history of Chinese 
exclusion and related laws and the resulting impacts on the emergence of Asian American 
communities in the United States); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: 
IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (tracing history of exclusions and removal of poor, political 
minorities, racial minorities, disabled, gays and lesbians, and other groups in U.S. immigration laws); 
LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS & THE SHAPING OF MODERN 
IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) (analyzing the impacts of the Chinese exclusion laws on the development 
of U.S. immigration law). An insightful philosophical explanation for American law’s harsh treatment 
of immigrants, as well as people of color generally, can be found in George A. Martinez, Race, 
American Law and the State of Nature, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 799 (2010). 
24. See JENNIFER BAILEY, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2010 
IMMIGRATION-RELATED BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JANUARY-MARCH 2010) (Ann 
Morse ed., 2010) (“With federal immigration reform stalled in Congress, state legislatures continue to 
tackle immigration issues at an unprecedented rate.”), available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx? 
tabid=20244. 
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Since 1990, new immigrant communities have emerged in parts of the 
nation, such as Arkansas, South Carolina, Iowa, Nebraska, and other rural areas of 
the Midwest and South, which had not previously seen large numbers of 
immigrants from Latin America.25 To illustrate, consider that in the much 
publicized 2009 raid on the meat and poultry processing plant in rural Postville, 
Iowa, more than ninety-five percent of the immigrant workers arrested were from 
Guatemala and Mexico.26 
Tensions have resulted from the changing Latina/o face of America. Due to 
the wider national distribution of immigrants (and Latina/os), the debate over 
immigration in modern times is no longer limited to the West and large urban 
cities in the East, as historically had been the case over much of the course of U.S. 
history. 
Some of the state and local immigration measures appear to be motivated by 
the alleged “failure” of the U.S. government to enforce the U.S. immigration 
laws.27 Such claims are commonplace despite the fact that deportations and 
detentions of noncitizens by the U.S. government have reached record highs for 
several years running;28 indeed, with respect to immigration, the Obama 
administration arguably has emphasized enforcement over almost all else.29 
Ongoing, if not growing, concerns with the class and race of many of today’s 
immigrants,30 as well as more legitimate grievances over other matters, such as the 
unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of immigration between the federal 
 
25. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in 
the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1493–96 (2002); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law 
in the Rural South, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135, 136–40 (2009).  
26. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S. Immigration Law and 
Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30–34 (2009). 
27. See Jeremy Duda, Arizona Gov. Brewer Lauded by the Right, Jeered by the Left, ARIZ. CAPITOL 
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at X (quoting Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s advisor: “She’s become the tip of 
the spear on the issue of border security and the failure of the Obama administration to execute on 
policies which protect this state and the citizens of the country . . . .”). 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 168–71. 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 117–18.  
30. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 23–30. Some of the influence of race and class can also be 
seen in local regulation of day laborers and taco trucks, as well as the enforcement of housing codes, 
which in many localities have disparate impacts on working class Latina/o immigrants. See Hispanic 
Taco Vendors of Wash. v. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the denial of 
injunctive relief seeking to halt enforcement of local law requiring the licensing of taco trucks and 
other street vendors); Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 367, 406 
(2010) (noting various local measures “to address the contemporary immigration crisis, [including] 
housing code sweeps . . . aimed at expelling immigrant residents . . . and anti-loitering ordinances in 
communities . . . targeting congregations of immigrant day laborers”) (footnotes omitted); Ernesto 
Hernández-Lopez, LA’s Taco Truck War: How LA Cooks Food Culture Contests (Sept. 2, 2010) 
(unpublished draft) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1694747 (analyzing critically efforts to regulate taco trucks in Los Angeles County). 
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and state and local governments,31 unquestionably have fueled support for the 
state and local immigration measures. 
The rapid growth of state and local involvement in immigration regulation is 
a relatively new phenomenon on the modern U.S. immigration landscape. For 
more than a century,32 the conventional wisdom was that federal power over 
immigration is exclusive, leaving relatively little room for state and local regulation. 
More than 160 years ago, the Supreme Court invalidated Massachusetts and New 
York laws that taxed passengers who arrived at their ports as an intrusion on the 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.33 The classic modern—and 
most emphatic—statement of federal supremacy over immigration can be found 
in the Court’s 1976 decision in DeCanas v. Bica: “Power to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”34 
Despite the high Court’s clear, and relatively recent, reaffirmation of the 
virtually unfettered federal power over immigration, state and local governments 
have increasingly acted in the realm of immigration in recent years. Colloquially 
speaking, the state and local governments have sought to take immigration law 
into their own hands. 
Unfortunately, the lower courts have not been entirely consistent in 
responding to the proper role of state and local governments vis-à-vis the federal 
government in the regulation of immigration and immigrants.35 Shortly after 
 
31. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDER AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 152–55 (2007). 
32. For analysis of state regulation of immigration before the U.S. Congress occupied the field 
in the late 1800s, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). 
33. See Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
34. 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). At the same time, the 
Court found that the California law in question—in that case barring the employment of 
undocumented workers before Congress made it unlawful in 1986, see infra text accompanying notes 
175–76,—was not preempted by federal law. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. at 365. This holding, which 
might seem somewhat incongruous with the idea that immigration is “exclusively a federal power,” 
arguably created the ambiguity resulting in the subsequent inconsistency on the scope of state and 
local power over immigration in the lower courts.  
 The flip side of the coin is that the federal government has been said to have “plenary power” 
over immigration, with limited judicial review of substantive immigration decisions. See Kevin R. 
Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 77 (2008), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2008/10/28/johnson.html. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 101–15 (2009) (summarizing the scope of federal power to 
regulate immigration).  
35. Compare Chamber of Commerce v. Edmonson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that major portions of Oklahoma law sanctioning employers for employing undocumented 
immigrants were preempted by federal law), and Lozano v. Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(invalidating most of a city immigration ordinance on federal preemption grounds), with Gray v. City 
of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 979–80 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming judgment on procedural grounds that 
a similar city ordinance was not preempted by federal law), and Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an Arizona law denying business licenses to 
employers that employed undocumented immigrant workers was not preempted by federal 
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Arizona passed its infamous immigration law known as S.B. 1070, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on a federal preemption case that dealt with a narrow 
provision of the U.S. immigration laws that permitted state regulation of business 
licenses; however, in its decision the Court did not generally clarify the respective 
roles of the federal and state governments in immigration regulation.36 
Immigration law and enforcement in the United States has been the near 
exclusive province of the federal government at least since the late nineteenth 
century. State and local governments, for example, unquestionably cannot enact 
their own Immigration and Nationality Acts,37 the name of the comprehensive 
federal immigration law, with their own rules for the admission and deportation of 
noncitizens. Imagine the chaos likely to result if Tennessee and New York, or 
Iowa and Texas, or, for that matter, Arizona, could regulate immigration in their 
own separate ways. 
The practical reasoning behind the federal preemption of state immigration 
laws is simple. The nation needs a uniform set of national immigration rules, not a 
patchwork of fifty different systems of immigration regulation.38 A national 
immigration scheme also is needed in part so that individual states do not simply 
shift migration from their state to other states.39 
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the states 
cannot conduct their own foreign policies.40 Only the federal government may 
 
immigration law), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct 1968 (2011). 
36. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc., 544 F.3d 976 (holding that an Arizona law denying business 
licenses to employers that employed undocumented immigrant workers was not preempted by federal 
immigration law), amended by 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d by Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct 1968 (2011). 
37. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). 
38. Importantly, the Supreme Court reached that conclusion long ago. See supra text 
accompanying notes 33–34.  
39. See Sergio Quintana, Immigrants Might Leave Arizona but Not the Country, Story on All Things 
Considered, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Aug. 27, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=129400993&ft=1&f=1003 (reporting that, after passage of Arizona S.B. 1070, see infra text 
accompanying notes 55–81, immigrants were moving from Arizona to other states, including New 
Mexico). States cannot constitutionally infringe on the right of U.S. citizens to travel between the 
states. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that state could not impose durational 
requirements for new residents to be eligible for public benefits when those requirements interfered 
with the right to travel). 
40. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (invalidating California law 
requiring insurance companies to provide information about Holocaust-era policies as impermissible 
interference with the President’s foreign affairs power); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (striking down Massachusetts law barring state agencies from purchasing goods 
and services from companies doing business with Burma as intruding on foreign affairs power of the 
federal government); see also Carol E. Head, Note, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional 
Implications for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries, 42 B.C. L. REV. 123, 124 
(2000) (“[T]he Dormant Foreign Affairs Power reserves power over foreign affairs exclusively to the 
federal government and precludes states and municipalities from interfering with the foreign affairs 
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articulate a U.S. foreign policy. In that vein, immigration law and enforcement can 
have serious foreign policy implications for the United States as a whole, which 
militate against states having their own immigration policies. For example, 
Arizona’s recent well-known foray into immigration41 provoked harsh 
condemnation from the President of Mexico.42 Previous state immigration 
measures, such as California’s Proposition 187,43 also generated criticism from 
high levels of the Mexican government.44  
California’s Proposition 187 would have, among other things, denied 
undocumented immigrant children access to the public schools and would have 
required school teachers, administrators, and other state and municipal employees 
to report suspected undocumented immigrants to federal authorities. After a 
campaign that most scholars today would agree was deeply marred by anti-
Mexican, anti-immigrant sentiment,45 the Golden State’s voters in 1994 
overwhelmingly passed this initiative only to have it unceremoniously struck down 
by a district court for intruding on the federal power to regulate immigration.46 
Thus, Arizona in 2010 was far from the first state to embroil itself in the national 
debate over immigration by seeking to become involved in regulating 
immigration.47 
Over the last few years, there has been considerable scholarly ferment 
concerning the role of state and local governments in regulating immigration and 
immigrants.48 There also has been much debate on the ground about the topic as 
state and local governments have passed immigration laws. 
 
power of the federal government.”); Jeremy K. Schrag, Note, A Federal Framework for Regulating the 
Growing International Presence of the Several States, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 449 (2009) (“The federal 
government can still preempt and invalidate state statutes that impermissibly interfere with the federal 
government’s foreign policy.”). 
41. See infra Part I.B. 
42. See Jerry Seper, Mexico’s Illegals Laws Tougher than Arizona’s; Calderon Condemns “Racial 
Discrimination”, WASH. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at 1; Igor I. Solar, Calderón Advises Mexicans Against Travel 
to Arizona, DIGITAL JOURNAL.COM, May 3, 2010, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/291513. 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 45–47.  
44. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 
121, 158, 165–66 (1994). 
45.  See generally Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and 
California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 
(1995) (analyzing the discriminatory nature of the initiative campaign); Kevin R. Johnson, Public 
Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
1509 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration] (scrutinizing racial and gender impacts 
of Proposition 187). 
46. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 769 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(“Because the federal government bears the exclusive responsibility for immigration matters, the 
states ‘can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, 
naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states.’” (quoting Takahashi v. 
Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (other citations omitted))).  
47. See infra text accompanying notes 56–82. 
48. A number of scholars have questioned the conventional wisdom and advocated greater 
state and local involvement in immigration and immigrant regulation. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The 
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To explore the contours of the ongoing debate, compare two distinctly 
different perspectives on state and local involvement in immigration. One 
observer, sympathetic to the rights of immigrants, has claimed that the state and 
local immigration laws have discriminatory racial impacts on Latina/os similar to 
those that the Jim Crow laws had on African Americans.49 From a very different 
perspective, advocates of strict enforcement of the immigration laws regularly rail 
on “sanctuary cities,” that is, cities that, believing it to be better law enforcement 
policy, restrict the exchange of information by local police and other local 
governmental agencies with federal immigration authorities.50 
 
Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Cristina M. Rodríguez, 
The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, 
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007); Spiro, supra note 44; see also 
Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1071–
73 (2007) (contending that local governments should be permitted to regulate immigration in a 
manner consistent with federal immigration law and policy). Other scholars have raised serious 
questions about state and local attempts to regulate immigration. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & John Shuford, 
Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!: Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration 
Reform, and Considering Whether “Immigration Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1 (2010); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting 
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579 (2009); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! 
“Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 
39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2007); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: 
Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27 (2007); Michael A. 
Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 
217 (1994); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004); Juliet P. 
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 
(2008); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008); Michael 
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001); see also Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, 
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2009) (analyzing 
critically local ordinances seeking to prohibit landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants).  
49. See Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010).  
50. See Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008) (analyzing 
precisely the meaning of various municipal “sanctuary” ordinances involving the treatment of 
immigrants and the controversy surrounding them); see also Rose Cuison Villazor,”Sanctuary Cities” and 
Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010) (examining ways in which local “sanctuary laws” 
demonstrate the tension between notions of national and local citizenship); Jennifer M. Hansen, 
Comment, Sanctuary’s Demise: The Unintended Effects of State and Local Enforcement of Immigration Law, 10 
SCHOLAR 289 (2008) (recognizing the threat of local enforcement of immigration laws on sanctuary 
cities); Christopher Carlberg, Note, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an Effective Uniform 
Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 740 (2009) (analyzing the 
origins and effectiveness of noncooperation laws in encouraging undocumented immigrants to report 
crimes to local law enforcement). Some local police departments fear that, if viewed as part of the 
immigration enforcement machinery of the nation, immigrants will be less likely to cooperate with 
police in crime investigation. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?: Local Sovereignty 
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2006). 
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Although questioned on policy grounds, state and local cooperation with the 
federal government in immigration enforcement has increased significantly over 
the last decade. The memoranda of understanding entered into under Immigration 
& Nationality Act § 287(g), coupled with enforcement-oriented immigration 
legislation passed by Congress in 1996,51 have increased the cooperation of state 
and local governments with the federal immigration authorities in enforcing the 
U.S. immigration laws.52 
Similarly, Secure Communities, a federal program touted by the Obama 
administration, also promotes cooperation between state and local police agencies 
with the federal government as part of an aggressive effort—at least ostensibly—
to remove serious criminal offenders from the United States.53 “Criminal aliens,” 
of course, are among the most unpopular subsets of all noncitizens, with precious 
few defenders in the political process.54 Despite the claim by the Obama 
administration that the information-sharing program would focus on criminal 
offenders who posed a serious danger to the public, “Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement records show that a vast majority, 79 percent, of people deported 
under Secure Communities had no criminal records or had been picked up for 
low-level offenses, like traffic violations and juvenile mischief.”55  
1. S.B. 1070: One State’s Effort to Bolster Immigration Enforcement 
Perhaps the most well-known recent example of an effort of a state to 
aggressively move into the realm of immigration enforcement came, not 
surprisingly, from a border state. In the last few years, Arizona, which shares a 
lengthy southern border with Mexico, has experienced a significant increase in 
undocumented immigration due to federal enforcement operations first put into 
place in El Paso, Texas and San Diego, California in the 1990s. Among other 
 
51. See infra note 166 (citing authority). 
52. See Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) (2006)). For critical analysis of 287(g) agreements, which allow state and local police with 
federal oversight to assist in the enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws, see Jennifer M. Chacón, A 
Diversion of Attention?: Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1563, 1582–86 (2010); Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: 
State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113 (2007). See also Mimi 
E. Tsankov & Christina J. Martin, Measured Enforcement: A Policy Shift in the ICE 287(g) Program, 31 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 403, 422 (2010) (evaluating the implementation of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s model “Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships”); Michael 
J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004) 
(examining the implication of local police enforcement’s “inherent authority” under federal law to 
make immigration arrests). 
53. See Jena Baker McNeill, Secure Communities: A Model for Obama’s 2010 Immigration Enforcement 
Strategy, WEBMEMO #2746 (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/ 
Secure-Communities-A-Model-for-Obamas-2010-Immigration-Enforcement-Strategy.  
54. See Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration, supra note 45, at 1531–34. 
55. Editorial, Immigration Bait and Switch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at A22. 
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consequences, these enforcement operations redirected migrants toward the 
United States-Mexico border in the southern part of the state.56 
Over time, public concerns in Arizona over immigration grew and reached a 
boiling point in 2010. That year, the Arizona legislature passed a law that through 
a variety of means sought to make “attrition through enforcement the public 
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.”57 Known popularly 
as S.B. 1070, the law includes provisions that proponents and opponents of the 
Arizona law agreed make it the toughest enforcement-oriented state or local 
immigration measure currently in existence. Not surprisingly, the law sparked a 
firestorm of national controversy. 
Section 1 of S.B. 1070 provides that “[t]he provisions of this act are intended 
to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of 
aliens . . . .”58 This statement of legislative intent, which sounds like an emphatic 
statement of a state immigration policy (albeit one with a myopic emphasis on 
enforcement), alone offers a textbook example of how facially neutral language 
can obscure and rationalize racial impacts, if not a discriminatory intent.59 
On its face, “aliens” is a race-neutral term borrowed from the U.S. 
immigration laws.60 However, in the context of the modern immigration 
demographics of Arizona, the terminology61 serves as thinly disguised code for 
 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 190–91. 
57. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (as amended); see Gabriel J. 
Chin, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Toni M. Massaro & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010). 
58. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 1 (emphasis added). 
59. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that state action resulting in a 
disparate racial impact did not necessarily violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment unless adopted or maintained with a “discriminatory intent”). 
60. See INA § 101(a)(3) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006)) (“The term 
‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”). 
61. More generally, the terminology employed often proves critical to the framing of the 
entire immigration debate. See Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and 
Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 (1996–1997) (analyzing how the 
term “alien” used to refer to noncitizens in the Immigration & Nationality Act adversely affects their 
treatment and effectively denies them personhood). See generally MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE 
SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2003) (examining 
emergence of “illegal aliens” in the United States).  
 Another pejorative that is regularly employed by restrictionists in the modern immigration 
debate is “anchor babies.” See, e.g., Kevin Alexander Gray, 14th Amendment Nullification Threatens Core of 
Citizenship, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Sept. 2, 2010, at 4A (criticizing Senator Lindsey 
Graham’s threat to revisit birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment because of 
undocumented immigrants having “anchor babies” or, as he put it, the “drop and leave”); Thomas 
Elias, More Fiction Than Fact About “Anchor Babies” Born in U.S., SALINAS CALIFORNIAN, Aug. 30, 2010 
(discussing the misconceptions surrounding “anchor babies” or “maternity tourism,” a term used by 
groups attempting to abolish birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment); Rex W. 
Huppke, Terror Babies, Anchor Babies, and Beanie Babies, Oh My!, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2010 (criticizing 
concern over “anchor babies” and a new fear espoused by politicians of “terror babies”). “Opponents 
of birthright citizenship use the term ‘anchor babies’ to refer to the U.S.-born, U.S. citizen children of 
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Mexican and Central American immigrants.62 This simple truth could not be lost 
on anyone with a superficial knowledge of modern immigration trends or the 
demographics of Arizona, which has a population that is roughly one-third 
Hispanic and nearly thirteen percent foreign-born.63 This presumably is why 
Latina/os across the United States reacted so negatively, and passionately, to S.B. 
1070.  
The use of code from the U.S. immigration and nationality laws as a 
surreptitious—and color-blind and facially neutral—way to discriminate on the 
basis of race would not be without historical precedent. Popular in the West in the 
early twentieth century, discriminatory state laws known as the “alien land laws” 
borrowed from U.S. immigration and nationality law to prohibit the ownership of 
certain real property by “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” In operation, the land 
laws targeted immigrants from Asia,64 because noncitizens at the time (and the 
 
undocumented parents.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue, 44 
GA. L. REV. 65, 86 n.52 (2009); see Nicole Newman, Note, Birthright Citizenship: The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Continuing Protection Against an American Caste System, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 437, 441 
(2008) (“[The] threat of chain migration, pejoratively called the ‘anchor baby’ phenomenon, is the 
most inflammatory rhetoric that opponents of birthright citizenship employ.”) (footnote omitted); see 
also Keith Aoki, Arizona—Pick on Someone Your Own Size, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 2010, at A16 
(analyzing critically an Arizona proposal to not issue birth certificates to “anchor babies”). Concerns 
with “anchor babies,” allegedly able to sponsor the lawful immigration of their undocumented 
parents, contributed to the recent debate over the abolition of birthright citizenship guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Julia Preston, Senator Picks Up the Fight Against Citizenship at Birth, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 9, 2010, at 4. There is a racial component to the “anchor babies” slur, which 
plays on racial, gender, and class stereotypes about Latina/os, see Gebe Martinez et al., Birthright 
Citizenship Debate Is a Thinly Veiled Attack on Immigrant Mothers, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 18, 
2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/citizenship_debate.html, just as 
there is to the stereotypical African American “welfare queen.” See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura 
Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 
38 HOWARD L.J. 473, 476–88 (1995) (analyzing the racialized images of Black women in the debate 
over welfare and welfare reform in the United States); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: 
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1647, 1665–73 (2005) 
(same). For a vigorous defense of birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment, see Garrett 
Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331 (2010). 
62. In this way, the Arizona law was enacted with similar racial code as was seen in California, 
where Governor Pete Wilson, who was running for reelection, ran nightly television advertisements in 
support of Proposition 187 stating ominously “[t]hey keep coming,” accompanied by dark news 
footage of persons appearing to be scrambling to cross the United States-Mexico border. See Richard 
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California’s Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision 
Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1521, 1555–56 (2000). For discussion of the anti-
immigrant, anti-Mexican undercurrent to the Proposition 187 campaign, see supra text accompanying 
notes 45–47.  
63. See Arizona QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
04000.html (last updated Dec. 23, 2011). 
64. See Johnson, supra note 45, at 648–50 (discussing how state “alien land laws,” although 
facially neutral and incorporating federal nationality law, served to discriminate against Japanese 
immigrants); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of 
Property, Race, and Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979 (2010) (critically analyzing major Supreme 
Court decision invalidating application of California’s Alien Land Law).  
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dominant—and most unpopular group—of immigrants of that era were from 
Japan) had to be “white” to be eligible for naturalization under the U.S. nationality 
laws.65 The alien land laws, it has been argued, served as a prelude to the infamous 
internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II, now a dark stain 
on the American memory.66 
As predicted by some prognosticators,67 the day before the Arizona law was 
to go into effect, a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the state from enforcing key immigration provisions of Arizona S.B. 
1070.68 The district court barred implementation of the provisions of the law that 
it concluded most directly impinged on the federal prerogative over immigration 
regulation and would most likely be found to be preempted by federal law.69 
Those parts of the law not directly intruding on the federal power to regulate 
immigration—such as the prohibition on Arizona officials from limiting 
enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws,70 or the portion of Section 5 that 
makes it a crime under certain circumstances for a motor vehicle to pick up day 
laborers71—were not subject to the injunction and went into effect. 
Although vehemently criticized by the supporters of the Arizona law,72 the 
district court ruling acknowledged the legitimate concerns of the Arizona 
legislature with the current circumstances of immigration. The court noted, at the 
outset of its ruling, that the legislature passed S.B. 1070 “[a]gainst a backdrop of 
rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human trafficking crimes, and 
serious public safety concerns.”73 Consistent with sensitivity to the state’s 
legitimate interests, the court carefully analyzed each section of the Arizona law 
and scrutinized whether the specific provision intruded on the federal power to 
regulate immigration.74 
 
65. See Johnson supra note 26, at 18–19. See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: 
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th anniversary ed., 2006) (analyzing development in the 
courts of the caselaw interpreting the whiteness requirement for naturalization in force in the 
nationality laws from 1790 to 1952). 
66. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Law” As a Prelude 
to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998); see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(refusing to disturb U.S. government’s decision to intern persons of Japanese ancestry on West 
Coast). See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Aspen Publishers 2001). 
67. I was one of them. See Kevin R. Johnson, Arizona Law Will Likely Collide with Constitution—
and Lose, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 2, 2010, at 1E. 
68. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011). 
69. See id. at 986–87.  
70. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 2(A); supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing 
public concern with “sanctuary cities”). 
71. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 5; see United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
72. See, e.g., Casey Newton, Critics Denounce ‘Activist Judge’; State Appeals Injunction, ARIZ. REP., 
July 30, 2010, at A1. 
73. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 985. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71. 
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In essence, the court found that the U.S. government is likely to prevail on 
its claims that the portions of the Arizona law that most directly purport to 
regulate immigration are preempted by federal law. Importantly, the court 
concluded that the portion of Section 275—one of the central, and most 
controversial, portions of the Arizona law76—that would have required a law 
enforcement “officer [to] make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration 
status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is a reasonable suspicion 
that the person is unlawfully present in the United States,” is likely to be 
preempted by federal law.77 
Significantly, the court made its initial substantive ruling in the challenges to 
S.B. 1070 in the case brought by the U.S. government in United States v. Arizona.78 
In actions filed before the one filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, civil rights 
organizations had made similar federal preemption arguments in separate 
challenges to the Arizona law.79 However, the argument that a state law is pre-
empted by federal law is most powerfully made by the national government itself 
when it asserts that a state is intruding on its power to regulate immigration. 
Conversely, the force of the argument is correspondingly weaker when made by 
groups representing private, or at least nongovernmental, parties.  
In addition, the U.S. government prudently limited its legal challenges to 
those sections of the Arizona law that most directly impinged upon the federal 
power to regulate immigration and thus to the portions of S.B. 1070 that were 
most vulnerable to a federal preemption claim.80 In this regard, the U.S. 
government studiously avoided alleging that the law would result in racial profiling 
or racial discrimination, thereby attempting to minimize any controversy and 
claims that it was engaging in racial politics or, put colloquially, “playing the race 
card.” Moreover, the Department of Justice assigned a seasoned attorney from the 
Solicitor General’s office, which ordinarily only appears on behalf of the United 
States in the U.S. Supreme Court, to argue the case on behalf of the United States 
in the district court in Arizona, an extraordinary step that unquestionably signaled 
to the district court the great importance of the case to the federal government.81  
 
75. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 2. 
76. See infra text accompanying notes 83–95. 
77. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 987. Previously, the language had been 
broader and applied to any “lawful contact” by police with persons. See id. at 994. 
78. See id. at 980. 
79. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. CV 
10-1061, Count 1 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010). 
80. See Complaint, United States v. Arizona, CV 10-1413 PHX SRB (D. Ariz. July 6, 2010) 
(limiting federal challenges to Sections 1-6 of Arizona S.B. 1070).  
81. See Jerry Markon, Edwin Kneedler a “Savvy” Choice to Argue Suit Against Ariz. Immigration Law, 
WASH. POST, July 31, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/07/30/AR2010073006222.html.  
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Because of its studied analysis of the law, as well as the sensitivity to state 
interests and scrupulous adherence to Supreme Court precedent, the district 
court’s ruling in United States v. Arizona was upheld by the Ninth Circuit and, in my 
estimation, stands a good chance of surviving its upcoming review by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The ruling follows relevant precedent, is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom, and is firmly within the constitutional mainstream.82 
2. One Color-Blind Defense: S.B. 1070 Bans Racial Profiling 
Many of the objections to S.B. 1070 centered around the contention that the 
law would inevitably result in increased racial profiling of Latina/os by state and 
local police in the name of immigration enforcement.83 Such claims carry special 
force in light of the history of discrimination against Latina/os in the state of 
Arizona.84 
For many years, state and local law enforcement authorities in Arizona have 
been subject to complaints of discrimination against Latina/os.85 Despite claims 
of racial neutrality, a focus on immigration status in virtually any law often 
 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. 
83. See Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling’s Unlikely Enabler: A High Court Ruling 
Underpins Arizona Immigration Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/AR2010071204049.html. 
84. See, e.g., Jacques Billeaud, Feds Sue Arizona Sheriff in Civil Rights Probe, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 2, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/2/feds-sue-arizona-sheriff-civil-
rights-probe (reporting on U.S. Department of Justice suit against Maricopa County Sheriff Joe 
Arpaio for refusing to produce documents in an investigation of civil rights violations); Patrick S. 
Cunningham, Comment, The Legal Arizona Worker’s Act: A Threat to Federal Supremacy over Immigration?, 
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 418–19 (2010) (criticizing the Legal Arizona Worker’s Act for harsher employer 
sanctions provisions than under federal law, but lacking antidiscrimination measures that exist under 
federal law); William Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2009, at 42 (reporting on Maricopa 
County’s controversial sheriff, Joe Arpaio, who regularly has been accused of violating the civil rights 
of Latina/o immigrants and citizens); Jerry Markon & Stephanie McCrummen, Justice Threatens to Sue 
Arizona Sheriff, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/17/AR20100817036 37.html (“Justice Department officials in 
Washington have issued a rare threat to sue Maricopa County [Arizona] Sheriff Joe Arpaio if he does 
not cooperate with their investigation of whether he discriminates against Hispanics.”); Mary Romero 
& Marwah Serag, Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting from INS and Local Police’s Use of Race, Culture 
and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75, 79–86 (2005) 
(criticizing immigration dragnet, and its impacts on the Latina/o community generally, in public 
places of Chandler, Arizona, a suburb of Phoenix); Mary Romero, State Violence, and the Social and Legal 
Construction of Latino Criminality: From El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087–98 
(2001) (studying tangible impacts of stereotypes of Latino criminality leading to the killing of a Latino 
male by Phoenix police); James Thomas Tucker, The Battle Over “Bilingual Ballots” Shifts to the Courts: A 
Post-Boerne Assessment of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 565 (2008) 
(analyzing the targeting of Latina/os for segregation in Arizona ostensibly on the basis of their 
language abilities but resulting in detrimental barriers to education); see also Sofia D. Martos, Note, 
Coded Codes: Discriminatory Intent, Modern Political Mobilization, and Local Immigration Ordinances, 85 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 2099 (2010) (offering equal protection analysis of how local immigration ordinances 
constitute unlawful racial discrimination). 
85. See supra note 84 (citing authorities). 
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generates fears among Latina/os, who are frequently stereotyped as “foreigners,”86 
that enforcement in fact will be based on race as a proxy for immigration status.87 
This in no small part is because of the racial demographics of the modern stream 
of immigrants—especially undocumented immigrants, a majority of whom are 
Latina/o—to the United States. 
Noticeably, the district court in United States v. Arizona failed to directly 
address the harshest criticisms of S.B. 1070, namely that the law might well have 
resulted in widespread racial profiling of Latina/os.88 This failure resulted directly 
from the nature of the U.S. government’s relatively narrow federal supremacy 
challenge to the law.89 
The defenses to claims that the Arizona law would result in racial 
discrimination exemplify the central role of color-blindness as a tool frequently 
employed by restrictionists in the modern debate over immigration. Defenders of 
S.B. 1070 aggressively claim the law has nothing to do with racial discrimination. 
To support that claim, they assert that racial profiling violates the law.90 That 
contention, however, is not entirely true in the realm of immigration enforcement. 
The Arizona law, as drafted, permits the consideration of race in its 
enforcement to the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution,91 which, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, sanctions the consideration of race as a relevant 
factor in immigration enforcement. In 1975, the Court expressly stated that 
“Mexican appearance”—whatever that phrase precisely means—may be one of 
many factors considered by border enforcement officers in making an 
immigration stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.92 The Arizona Supreme Court agreed.93 Given 
 
86. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 101, 117–29 (1997) (analyzing the stereotype of Latina/os, including U.S. citizens, as 
“foreigners” who refuse to assimilate). See generally STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: 
LATINOS, LAW AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2005) (analyzing critically stereotypes of 
Latina/os in U.S. popular culture). 
87. See supra text accompanying notes 3–8 (mentioning concept of discrimination by proxy). 
Similarly, Arizona saw a racially polarized debate over an English-only law passed by voters that had 
national origin consequences. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1689, 1742 (2006); see also Juan Carlos Linares, Si Se Puede? Chicago Latinos Speak on Law, the 
Law School Experience and the Need for an Increased Latino Bar, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 321, 334–35 
(2009) (discussing the approval by voters of amendment to the Arizona Constitution making English 
the official language of Arizona and prohibiting state employees from using non-English languages in 
performing their official duties, which the Arizona Supreme Court struck down). 
88. See Randal C. Archibold, Preemption, Not Profiling, in Challenge to Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2010, at A15 (noting that U.S. government was not challenging S.B. 1070 on racial profiling grounds). 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
90. See Chin & Johnson, supra note 83. 
91. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 2(J) ( “This section [section 2] shall be implemented in 
a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and 
respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.”) (emphasis added). 
92. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975). See generally Kevin R. 
Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and 
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that judicial endorsement, it should not be surprising that law enforcement 
authorities have regularly been charged with engaging in a pattern and practice of 
racial profiling, with “Mexican” appearance as its touchstone in immigration 
enforcement.94 
Consequently, racial profiling is likely to be exacerbated—and, at a 
minimum, expanded—if state and local law enforcement officers are permitted to 
enforce the U.S. immigration laws. The risks are especially great if these officers 
are not adequately and appropriately trained in the notorious complexities of U.S. 
immigration law and its enforcement.95  
3. Another Color-Blind Defense: S.B. 1070 Simply “Mirrors” Federal Law 
Another defense offered by supporters of the Arizona law has been that S.B. 
1070 simply “mirrors” federal law and therefore cannot be unconstitutional.96 
However, as the district court found in United States v. Arizona,97 the Arizona law 
 
Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010) (analyzing 
how Supreme Court decisions in effect sanctioned racial profiling in both criminal law enforcement 
and immigration law enforcement). 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose geographic jurisdiction includes 
Arizona, held that Latina/o appearance could not be considered by border enforcement officers in 
the U.S./Mexico border region. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1128–35 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Johnson, supra, at 1033–35 (analyzing Montero-Camargo). In other circuits, 
the courts regularly state in a conclusory manner that racial and ethnic appearance can be one factor 
in an immigration stop. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Moya, 353 Fed. Appx. 930, 934 (5th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (“The Supreme Court has held that ethnic appearance may be considered as one of 
the relevant factors in supporting a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is involved in the 
transportation of illegal aliens.”); United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(ruling that reasonable suspicion justifying a stop existed based on seven factors, including that “the 
driver and all five passengers were Hispanic adult males”); see also Barrera v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Civ. No. 07-3879, 2009 WL 825787, *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2009) (“[R]ace may be properly 
considered by an official in making the determination to stop an individual to inquire about his 
immigration status.”) (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87). 
93. See Arizona v. Graciano, 653 P.2d 683, 687 n.7 (1982). 
94. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 675, 697–702 (2000) (reviewing consistent claims of racial profiling of Latina/os in immigration 
enforcement). 
95. See Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (“With only a small degree 
of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code in 
complexity.’” (quoting ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF ALIENS 107 (1985))); see also Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that U.S. 
immigration laws resemble “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete”). 
96. See Leslie Berestein, Ariz. Law Passes Constitutional Test, Professors Say, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., May 14, 2010, at B3 (discussing claim of one of the drafters of S.B. 1070 that the state law 
simply mirrored federal law). 
97. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011). For analysis of the complexities of states seeking to 
criminalize violations of federal immigration law, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The 
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law (Univ. of Ariz., Arizona Legal 
Studies Discussion Paper No. 10-25, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648685. 
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criminalizes conduct related to immigration that is not criminalized by federal law, 
thus on its face going beyond—and not simply mirroring—federal law. 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 also would extend state and local government’s 
enforcement authority over the U.S. immigration laws and mandate that police 
exercise it,98 another major enforcement-oriented change wrought by the Arizona 
law. It is true that concurrent enforcement of federal law by state and federal 
authorities is ordinarily permitted. However, immigration regulation in the modern 
era has been viewed as exclusively a federal power.99 State and local enforcement 
must be done consistent with federal law and enforcement priorities and with 
appropriate federal oversight.100 
To the extent that parts of the Arizona law in fact mirror federal law, the 
state law builds on existing U.S. immigration laws, which are replete with racial 
and class impacts resulting from facially neutral language.101 Even though such 
impacts may not serve as the basis for challenging the law, it is worth noting in 
attempting to gain a better understanding of the vehemence of the reaction of 
many Latina/os to S.B. 1070. 
4. Conclusion 
Until the Arizona legislature intervened, immigration reform and 
immigration, after hitting a high-water mark of public awareness with mass 
marches in cities across the United States in spring 2006,102 had receded somewhat 
in the national consciousness. If nothing else, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 returned 
immigration to the front pages of newspapers across the country—indeed, around 
the world. After the Arizona legislature passed the law, for example, opponents 
across the country made impassioned pleas for economic boycotts of the state.103 
The law also triggered a renewed heated national debate over immigration.  
Like it or not, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 reflected the deep and wide public 
concern with undocumented immigration and perceived deficiencies in 
immigration enforcement in the United States. Nonetheless, this Article contends 
that the proper way to respond to the problems is not through state and local 
efforts to regulate immigration. Rather, it is best handled by Congress on a 
national level through a uniform, comprehensive system of immigration rules and 
 
98. See Ariz. S.B. 1070, supra note 57, § 2(B). 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
100. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). For 
example, under § 287(g) agreements, state and local law enforcement officers agree to receive federal 
training in order to assist the federal government in enforcing U.S. immigration laws. See supra text 
accompanying notes 51–52. 
101. See generally Johnson, supra note 26 (analyzing racial and class impacts of the operation of 
the facially neutral U.S. immigration laws). 
102. See infra text accompanying notes 111–14. 
103. See, e.g., Russ Britt, Nationwide Boycotts Are Hurting Arizona’s Hospitality Business, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), June 6, 2010, at S1. 
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regulations.104 
Put differently, Congress could do much to calm immigration tensions in 
states and localities across the United States by passing meaningful immigration 
reform that addresses the true causes of the undocumented migration of workers, 
such as the availability of jobs in this country,105 and by directly assisting state and 
local governments with the costs of immigration.106 Absent a clear declaration by 
the Supreme Court about the role of state and local governments in immigration 
regulation or congressional enactment of some kind of meaningful comprehensive 
immigration reform, the proliferation of state and local immigration laws likely will 
continue. Given the broad public concern, politicians, if not immigrants and 
citizens, have much to gain both personally and politically through promoting and 
defending such laws. 
In sum, state and local laws seeking to regulate immigration and the activities 
of immigrants have been on the rise over the last decade. They disparately impact 
Latina/o immigrants and U.S. citizens. The United States likely will continue to 
see the enactment of such laws so long as state and local governments are 
permitted to operate in the realm of immigration and Congress fails to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform. 
B. The Rise, Fall, Rise, and Fall of Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
The U.S. Congress has spent a good amount of time during the first decade 
of the twenty-first century debating immigration reform, albeit in fits and starts. 
Initially, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, a flurry of legislative 
activity resulting in the passage of two acts of Congress significantly tightened the 
U.S. immigration laws in the name of the national security.107 In addition, a myriad 
of immigration-related steps were taken by the Bush administration in the name of 
the “war on terror” after September 11, many of which were harshly criticized for 
their negative civil rights consequences.108 
 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 25–55. 
105. See infra text accompanying notes 146–53. 
106. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 152–54. 
107. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 
231, 302–24 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA 
PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., 49 
U.S.C, 50 U.S.C).  
108. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); 
Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After 
September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2002); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); 
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and 
After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2002); Victor C. Romero, Decoupling “Terrorist” 
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Right or wrong, the concerns over immigration became dominated by 
national security concerns in the wake of September 11. Consequently, the debate 
over immigration reform and border security very quickly morphed into a debate 
about national security.109 Ultimately, the security measures directed at noncitizens 
had dramatic impacts on—including record levels of deportations of—noncitizens 
from Mexico and Central America, almost all of whom had nothing to do 
whatsoever with terror and terrorism.110 This raises the question whether those 
with a restrictionist political agenda exploited security concerns to justify a general 
crackdown on immigrants.  
A few years after September 11, 2001, Congress considered immigration 
reform legislation going beyond that focused on national security. In December 
2005, the House of Representatives passed the Sensenbrenner Bill, which included 
many enforcement-oriented provisions, including the criminalization of the mere 
status of being undocumented. The harshness of the bill resulted in 
unprecedented—because decidedly proimmigrant—mass marches of thousands of 
people in cities across the United States in support of nothing less than justice for 
undocumented immigrants.111 Responding in part to the marchers’ demand for 
justice, the Senate subsequently passed a more balanced comprehensive 
immigration reform bill that included a legalization program. Congress, however, 
ultimately failed to enact it, or any other compromise bill, into law.112 
Despite the incredible flurry of energy and activity, the end result was that in 
2006 Congress could only agree to authorize an extension of the fence along the 
United States-Mexico border.113 The extension was ultimately little more than a 
symbolic gesture at immigration reform and one that few would contend has 
 
From “Immigrant:” An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201 
(2003); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002).  
109. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After 
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1376–1404 (2007). 
110. See Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes Home, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849 (2003); Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and 
Its Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153 (2002); Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The 
War on Terrorism as a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 563–
75 (2004).  
111. See Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the 
Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (2007); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, 
The Immigrant Rights Marches (Las Marchas): Did the “Gigante” (Giant) Wake Up or Does It Still Sleep 
Tonight?, 7 NEV. L.J. 780 (2007). 
112. See Johnson & Hing, supra note 111, at 103–04. The inability of Latina/os to enact 
immigration reform in part results from the limits on Latina/o political power due to the fact that a 
significant number are not U.S. citizens. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” 
Giant: The Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1259 (2008). 
113. See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006)). 
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directly resulted in a decline in the undocumented population in the United 
States.114 
With the election of President Obama in 2008, some immigrant rights 
advocates expressed optimism about the possibility that Congress might pass 
comprehensive immigration reform. In addition to stating that the administration 
supported reform of the immigration laws, as a U.S. senator Obama had 
previously demonstrated consistent support for immigrant causes; in the face of 
strong criticism, he advocated for driver’s license eligibility for undocumented 
immigrants115 and for passage of some version of the DREAM (Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act,116 which would provide a way for 
undocumented college students to, among other things, regularize their 
immigration status. 
However, the initial optimism about the possibility for meaningful 
immigration reform during the Obama administration has dimmed in light of the 
administration’s initial steps on immigration, which have focused primarily on 
increased enforcement. As discussed in Part II of this Article, disparate negative 
impacts on Latina/os—including but not limited to deaths on the border, 
increases in human trafficking, racial profiling, and other civil rights 
deprivations—result from increased border enforcement. 
President Obama’s first major step into immigration was to appoint Janet 
Napolitano, the former Governor of Arizona, to head the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. With respect to immigration, she has made enforcement a top 
priority, with the promise of future positive improvements for immigrants if 
Congress passes immigration reform.117 In the name of calming tensions along the 
United States-Mexico border, the Obama administration in spring 2010, after the 
Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1070, deployed more than a thousand National 
Guard troops to the region.118  
 
114. See infra text accompanying notes 160–87. 
115. See Patricia Smith, Whose Side Are You On? Here’s Where John McCain and Barack Obama 
Stand on 10 Key Issues: Who Would You Vote For?, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Nov. 3, 2008, at 8(7), available 
at http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/upfront/features/index.asp?article= 
f110308_10issues. 
116. See Tyche Hendricks, McCain, Obama Avoiding Fray on Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 
2008, at A1. For analysis of the political debate over the DREAM Act, see Michael A. Olivas, The 
Political Economy of the DREAM Act and the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1757 (2009); Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and 
Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 452–56 (2004). A version of the DREAM Act 
failed to get out of the Senate at the end of 2010. See Lisa Mascaro & Michael Muskal, DREAM Act 
Fails to Advance in Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ 
dec/18/news/la-pn-senate-dream-20101219. 
117. See Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A 
Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2009). 
118. See Michael D. Shear, National Guard Will Bolster Mexico Border; Obama to Deploy 1,200 
Troops in Volatile Area, BOS. GLOBE, May 26, 2010, at 11. For an analysis of the Obama 
administration’s immigration and civil rights agenda in the early part of his presidency, see Cristina M. 
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Some lawmakers, particularly Latina/o members of Congress,119 continue to 
advocate for Congress to pass some form of comprehensive immigration reform. 
In early 2010, two proposals were floated in the U.S. Congress, one in the House 
and one in the Senate.120 In the summer of 2010, President Obama made a speech 
calling for Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform.121 However, the 
fall 2010 midterm elections cooled interest in Congress for immigration reform, 
though it remained deeply controversial and divisive among the public at large. 
Despite the apparent stalling of immigration reform, it continues to be an 
especially important issue to many Latina/os, who turned out in record numbers 
for President Obama in the 2008 election. The current “broken” immigration 
system122 has a direct and palpable impact on the greater Latina/o community, 
including many U.S. citizens of Latina/o descent.123 More generally, immigration 
law and enforcement is viewed by many Latina/os and U.S. citizens as a central 
modern civil rights issue, touching on deeply important issues of race and class as 
well as full membership in U.S. society.124 
In the face of disparate racial consequences of the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform, opponents of comprehensive immigration reform frequently 
employ as justification for their positions the claim of color-blindness and an 
expressed desire to simply enforce the current U.S. immigration laws.125 We saw 
the same general phenomenon with respect to the disparate racial impacts of the 
Arizona law, which some commentators had claimed (not entirely accurately, in 
my estimation), simply sought to enforce the U.S. immigration laws.126 
This Article contends that color-blindness is a most effective rhetorical tool 
for restrictionists and others to legitimately pursue racial ends, namely to limit 
immigration from Mexico, as well as Latin America, Asia, and Africa more 
generally.127 Even if one disagrees with the claim that supporters possess any 
discriminatory intent, it is clear that the immigration measures pursued by 
restrictionists have disparate impacts on people of color. To deny that fact by 
claiming not to be racist but to simply want to enforce existing law fails to 
 
Rodríguez, The Early Obama Administration: Immigration and the Civil Rights Agenda, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 125 (2010). 
119. See, e.g., Press Release from Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez, 4th Dist. Ill., Immigration Reform Still 
Possible This Year (July 14, 2010), available at http://www.gutierrez.house.gov/index.php?view= 
article&catid=43%3A2010-press-releases&id=598%3Arep-gutierrez-qimmigration-reform-still-possible-
this-yearq&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=55. 
120. See Gary Martin, Obama Makes His Case for Immigration Reform, HOUS. CHRON., July 2, 
2010, at A1. 
121. See id. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 12–16. 
123. See Aoki & Johnson, supra note 21. 
124. See Johnson, supra note 26. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 3–8. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 96–101. 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 3–8. 
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respond to the legitimate concerns of those directly affected by the disparate racial 
impacts.  
II. THE RACIALLY DISPARATE IMPACTS OF THE FAILURE OF COMPREHENSIVE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM. 
Many of the so-called comprehensive immigration reform proposals that 
have been made in Congress in recent years include three basic components.128 
The first calls for increased immigration enforcement, which in many quarters is 
the least controversial, and indeed probably is the most politically popular.129 
Second, many comprehensive immigration reform proposals provide for a guest 
worker program and other incremental changes to the laws that would help to 
address U.S. labor needs, although most of them in my estimation do not go far 
enough to truly bring U.S. immigration laws in line with those labor needs.130 
Third, comprehensive immigration reform generally includes some kind of path to 
earned legalization for millions of undocumented immigrants who satisfy certain 
requirements, such as learning English and paying a fine and any back taxes; this 
component of reform is by far the most politically controversial.131  
In operation, each of these components of comprehensive immigration 
reform would have disparate benefits for the greater Latina/o community. In turn, 
there are direct losses to Latina/os resulting from the failure of Congress to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform and maintenance of the immigration status 
quo. There are some indirect, yet tangible, harms to Latina/os as well. 
This Part of the Article highlights some of the most obvious direct and 
indirect injuries to Latina/os resulting from the failure of Congress to enact some 
kind of comprehensive immigration reform. 
A. The Clear Losses for Latina/os If Comprehensive Immigration Reform Is Not Enacted. 
This section of the Article identifies some obvious direct harms that would 
result from the failure of Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform. 
Despite the fervent denial that the aggressive efforts to halt reform are based on 
race, the harms caused by the continuation of the status quo (due to the failure of 
reform) will fall disproportionately on people of color, especially Latina/os. 
 
128. See supra note 13 (citing authorities analyzing various comprehensive immigration reform 
proposals). 
129. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 1608. 
130. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 13–15. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 31 (advocating for 
more liberalized U.S. immigration law).  
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132–45. 
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1. The Maintenance of a Racial Caste of Undocumented Immigrants 
Often denigrated and delegitimized by its opponents as an unjust “amnesty” 
for lawbreakers and criminals, any proposal to regularize the status of 
undocumented immigrants has encountered stiff, as well as deeply emotional, 
political opposition.132 Much of that opposition is legalistic and moralistic in 
tone.133 It often tries to minimize or ignore the disparate racial impacts of failure 
to reform the U.S. immigration laws. 
In the face of the vehement resistance to any sort of “amnesty,” strong 
arguments have been made for earned legalization of certain categories of 
undocumented immigrants.134 Indeed, for many immigrant advocates, such a 
program for long-term residents is a necessary ingredient of comprehensive 
immigration reform. Such an amnesty for undocumented immigrants would not 
be unprecedented in American history. Amnesty, for example, was a critical 
component of the last major piece of comprehensive immigration reform 
legislation passed by Congress, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA), signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, a conservative Republican 
icon.135 
The adoption of an earned legalization program, with possible requirements 
including payment of a fine and any back taxes and learning English, would bring 
millions of undocumented immigrants in from the “shadows”136 of American 
social life. Conversely, the failure to adopt a legalization program will ensure that 
the undocumented continue life at the margins. 
 
132. See Bryn Siegel, Note, The Political Discourse of Amnesty in Immigration Policy, 41 AKRON L. 
REV. 291 (2008).  
133. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. To the best of my knowledge, tax, parking 
ticket, or even gun “amnesties” have generally failed to provoke similar outrage among large segments 
of the public. 
134. See, e.g., Richard Boswell, Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools: Registration and 
Cancellation, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175 (2010); Hiroshi Motomura, What Is “Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform”?: Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225 (2010). 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 164–72. 
136. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 
2004) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/ 
20040107-3.html) (observing that undocumented immigrants “seek only to earn a living end up in the 
shadows of American life—fearful, often abused and exploited”); see GABRIEL THOMPSON, 
WORKING IN THE SHADOWS: A YEAR OF DOING THE JOBS (MOST) AMERICANS WON’T DO (2010) 
(offering firsthand account by journalist working with undocumented immigrants in various low wage 
jobs in challenging conditions across the United States). 
 Some might object to the requirement of learning English for legalization as a form of forced 
assimilation that frequently has been imposed on persons of Mexican ancestry in the United States. 
See generally Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American 
Experience, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (1997) (analyzing the historical demand for assimilation placed on 
persons of Mexican ancestry in the United States). 
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Without legalization, undocumented workers will continue being denied the 
fundamental protections available to other workers under federal labor law137 and 
will be subject to continued exploitation in the workplace.138 Their daily lives will 
continue to be marked by the lingering fear of removal from the country, their 
family, and their friends for something as mundane and inconsequential to most 
Americans as being pulled over for a broken taillight.139  
It was estimated that, as of March 2008, approximately 11.9 million 
undocumented immigrants lived in the United States.140 The number appears to 
have declined somewhat since then because of the downturn in the American 
economy.141 What appears to have remained roughly constant is that 
 
137. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140, 151 (2002) 
(holding that undocumented workers were not entitled under federal labor law to the remedy of 
backpay for employer’s violation of their rights to organize). For criticism, see generally Christopher 
David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, The New Bracero Program, and 
the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert I. Correales, 
Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103 
(2003); Harv. L. Rev., Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2224–41 
(2005). See also Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of 
Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 738 (2003) (“[T]he immigrant 
workers’ movement suffered another severe and shocking setback when the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB in March 2002.”); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented 
Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 345 (2001) (analyzing lack of labor protections for undocumented workers). 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 195–97. 
139. Undocumented immigrants are not eligible for driver’s licenses in most states. See Kevin 
R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 
215 (2004) (“The ability to obtain a driver’s license has civil rights implications for undocumented 
Mexican immigrants.”); María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of 
Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 92–93 (2004) (observing that obtaining a driver’s 
license has “become a battleground in our country’s debate regarding immigration policy”); see also 
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the “War on Terrorism,” and Immigrants: Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 
MO. L. REV. 775, 798–807 (2002) (analyzing controversy over driver’s license eligibility for 
undocumented immigrants in Missouri); Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Aliens” in Our 
Midst Post-9/11: Legislating Outsiderness within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1711–22 (2005) 
(reviewing BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY (MAPPING 
RACISIMS) (2003)); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2003); VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, 
AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2004) (analyzing the deeper implications of the driver’s license 
controversy and the federal government’s response to the controversy over driver’s licenses in the 
states). Undocumented drivers therefore risk arrest—and possibly even removal—if they are pulled 
over by the police for a minor traffic violation.  
140. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, A PORTRAIT OF 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 14, 2009), available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1190/portrait-unauthorized-immigrants-states. 
141. The undocumented population appears to have declined to an estimated 11.1 million by 
March 2009. See JEFFREY PASEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., U.S. UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRATION FLOWS ARE DOWN SHARPLY SINCE MID-DECADE (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=126. 
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approximately sixty percent of all undocumented immigrants originate from 
Mexico.142 
The statistics suggest that a legalization program would benefit many 
undocumented Mexican immigrants, as well as their lawful immigrant and U.S. 
citizen family members.143 In turn, by continuing to deny legal immigration status 
to undocumented immigrants, maintaining the status quo would disparately affect 
Latina/os. Consequently, the failure of Congress to enact immigration reform 
containing an earned legalization program would disproportionately affect 
Latina/os. 
Despite its benefits to undocumented immigrants, legalization, as with the 
IRCA amnesty, ultimately is little more than a short-term fix for the needs of a 
significant portion of the current undocumented population. As we learned with 
the 1986 reforms,144 only broader reform that addresses the labor causes of 
migration will avoid the possibility of the future emergence of a new 
undocumented population after the current population is legalized. A long-term 
solution to undocumented immigration requires an overhaul of the rules for legal 
immigration so as to reduce the incentives for noncitizens to violate the law by 
journeying to the United States to work.145 
2. The Failure to Adjust the U.S. Immigration Laws to Meet U.S. Labor Needs  
(and Maintenance of the Incentives for Undocumented Immigration) 
The U.S. immigration laws have been said to fail to account for the labor 
needs of the nation, which has contributed to a continuous flow of undocumented 
immigrants to this country from the developing world during the last half of the 
twentieth century.146 At a fundamental level, many, probably most, undocumented 
immigrants come to the United States to work,147 not to access the public benefit 
system, commit crime, or have “anchor babies”148—which are just a few of the 
charges frequently leveled against them.  
Without comprehensive immigration reform, there will be no guest worker 
program or any more significant—and much-needed—overhaul to the labor 
migration provisions of the U.S. immigration laws.149 Without reform, the 
 
142. See supra notes 140–41 (citing authorities).  
143. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of mixed immigration 
status families among Latina/os in the United States). 
144. See infra text accompanying notes 164–72. 
145. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 13–15. 
146. See id. 
147. See id.  
148. See supra note 61 (analyzing pejorative “anchor baby” terminology). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45; see also BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: 
NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION, AND MEXICAN MIGRATION (2010) (analyzing the impacts of labor flows 
to the United States from Mexico created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and offering recommendations on steps to reduce those flows and gain control of labor migration 
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disconnect between the nation’s labor needs and immigration laws will continue to 
disproportionately affect people of color from the developing world, especially 
Mexico and Latin America, who will continue to lack an avenue for legal 
immigration to the United States and will continue to have the incentive to come 
to, and remain in, this country in violation of the law.150 
Without reform, we can expect undocumented workers, a majority of them 
Latina/o, to continue to be exploited in the workplace.151 Despite being subject to 
exploitation, these workers will continue to have limited recourse to remedies 
under the law to ensure the enforcement of labor protections. Employers thus will 
continue to have access to exploitable—and readily disposable—labor. 
Truth be told, the incremental changes to the labor provisions in many of 
the current immigration reform proposals on the table would not fully address the 
current incentives for undocumented immigration in the U.S. immigration laws. 
Only major revisions to the law that ease the barriers to migration of low-skilled 
and medium-skilled workers to the United States would serve to reduce the 
growth of a new undocumented population if the current one were legalized.152 
Incremental revisions may be better than nothing, however, and may decrease the 
current pressures resulting in the current flows of undocumented migrants. 
Given that currently sixty percent of the undocumented population is of 
Mexican origin—almost all of whom have no lawful means for migrating to the 
United States153—it appears that a liberalization of the labor migration provisions 
of the U.S. immigration laws would disproportionately benefit people of color 
who want to come to the United States lawfully to work. Conversely, a failure to 
reform the current labor migration provisions would continue to disparately harm 
Latina/o immigrant workers and ensure their continued exploitation in the 
American workplace. 
3. More Enforcement with Disparate Impacts on Latina/os 
For reasons discussed in the next section of the Article,154 it is likely that any 
increased immigration enforcement—with many enforcement-oriented measures 
having already come without the passage of comprehensive immigration 
reform155—will disparately impact Latina/os. This substantial cost to Latina/os 
warrants discussion in any proposal calling for increased immigration 
enforcement.  
Specifically, removals and border apprehensions tend to fall squarely on 
 
from Mexico). 
150. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 13–15. 
151. See infra text accompanying notes 195–97. 
152. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 13–15. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45. 
154. See infra text accompanying notes 160–223. 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
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Latina/os; other heightened enforcement efforts are likely to do so as well.156 
Thousands of Mexican citizens have died along the United States-Mexico border 
due to increased enforcement efforts put into place by the U.S. government over 
the last twenty years.157 Increased border enforcement efforts are likely to result in 
more deaths. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the facially neutral immigration laws, under the 
guise of color-blindness,158 have contributed to the creation of segmented labor 
markets with a racial caste quality; many undocumented Latina/o immigrants 
labor in the lowest paying jobs and work under the most difficult conditions.159 
Absent meaningful changes to the current immigration laws, increased 
enforcement is likely to perpetuate the exploitation of undocumented immigrants, 
disproportionately harming Latina/o immigrant workers. 
B. Collateral, but Not Inconsequential, Impacts of the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform: The Human Costs of Continued and Increased Enforcement 
Increased immigration enforcement, with the hope of convincing some 
members of Congress to support more far-reaching reform, is part of virtually all 
of the current proposed “comprehensive immigration reform” proposals. The 
kind of enforcement measures recently on the table run the gamut from biometric 
Social Security cards for better verification of employment eligibility to increasing 
the number of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers.160 There also 
are continued calls for extending the fence along the United States-Mexico border 
and increasing detentions and deportations. Indeed, enhanced enforcement 
measures that appear to “secure the borders” and “enforce the law” are among the 
most politically popular feature of almost any multifaceted immigration reform 
proposal.161 
Along these lines, some have claimed that the nation must establish that 
immigration enforcement is effective before Congress even considers enacting any 
immigration reforms that might benefit immigrants, such as earned legalization or 
a guest worker program.162 Such a poison pill might indefinitely delay passage of 
comprehensive immigration reform. 
 
156. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 1608. 
157. See infra text accompanying notes 188–90. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 3–8. 
159. See infra text accompanying notes 195–97. 
160. See Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, The Right Way to Mend Immigration, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 19, 2010, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/03/17/AR2010031703115.html (making both of these suggestions as part of a comprehensive 
immigration reform proposal). In August 2010, the Senate passed a bill that would increase 
appropriations for border security. See Lisa Mascaro, Border Buildup Sent to Obama; Backers Hope Move 
Paves Way for Full Overhaul, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2010, at C12. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 128–31. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 132–45. 
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Even without comprehensive immigration reform, the nation has 
experienced increased enforcement activity in both the waning years of the Bush 
administration and throughout the Obama administration.163 Both presidents 
presumably believed that increased enforcement would make other components 
of reform more politically palatable to members of Congress and the general 
public. 
In evaluating future enforcement measures, it is only appropriate that we 
consider the effectiveness of increased enforcement since 1986, when Congress 
passed the last major piece of legislation that might be characterized as 
comprehensive immigration reform. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986164 was a package of enhanced enforcement measures (including provisions 
allowing for the imposition of civil sanctions on the employers of undocumented 
workers), amnesty for undocumented immigrants, and guest worker programs.165 
More enforcement legislation and measures followed that major reform.166 This 
legislation criminalized the violation of the U.S. immigration laws and facilitated 
increased—indeed record—removals of “criminal aliens”; both phenomena have 
been much discussed in immigration law scholarship.167 Deportations of 





163. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18. 
164. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
165. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 178 (6th ed. 2008) (“In 1986, after years of debate, Congress enacted the most far-
reaching immigration legislation since the 1950s”—the Immigration Reform and Control Act.); 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 1158 (5th ed. 2009) (“The central target of IRCA was illegal immigration, which the statute 
attacked on several fronts.”). 
166. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). For a capsule summary of the various immigration 
reform measures enacted since 1986, see Laurence M. Krutchik, Note, Down But Not Out: A 
Comparison of Previous Attempts at Immigration Reform and the Resulting Agency Implemented Changes, 32 NOVA 
L. REV. 455 (2008). 
167. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National 
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, 
Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 81 (2005); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
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TABLE 1. Comparison of Removals and Total Undocumented Population 
 
Fiscal Year Number of Removals Undocumented Population 
2008 358,886168 11.9 million169 
 
1990 30,039170 5 million171 
 
 
As the data show, the U.S. government has dramatically increased the 
number of removals of noncitizens by more than tenfold in less than twenty years. 
Over the same time period, the undocumented population has not diminished in 
size. In fact, it has roughly doubled. This is a telling statistic in evaluating the overall 
effectiveness of an enforcement-oriented immigration policy. 
Based on the dramatic increase in the size of the undocumented population, 
one can legitimately question how effective increased immigration enforcement 
efforts, with their huge fiscal and human costs, have been. Keep in mind that 
deportations of noncitizens often have negative impacts on families and children, 
including many U.S. citizen children who may be effectively deported when one or 
both parents are.172 Increased enforcement imposes more human and fiscal costs 
 
168.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008 (July 2009) (Table 2), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf. The data shows 
that roughly one-half of the noncitizens deported from the country were removed for reasons other 
than criminal convictions. See id. The Obama administration proceeded to surpass 2008 removals with 
more “record-breaking” removals. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano 
Announces Record-breaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics Achieved under the Obama 
Administration (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_ 
1286389936778.shtm (reporting announcement of “record-breaking immigration enforcement 
statistics . . . —including unprecedented numbers of convicted criminal alien removals and overall 
alien removals in fiscal year 2010. . . . In fiscal year 2010, ICE set a record for overall removals of illegal aliens, 
with more than 392,000 removals nationwide.”) (emphasis added). 
169.  See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 140. 
170.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS: 2003 
(Table 40) (Aliens expelled: fiscal years 1892–2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ 
publications/YrBk03En.shtm. 
171.  In 1997, the U.S. government estimated that 5 million undocumented immigrants resided 
in the United States as of October 1996. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION RESIDING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: OCTOBER 1996, at 2 (Aug. 1997). 
172. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC-UC BERKELEY, CHIEF JUSTICE 
EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON RACE, ETHNICITY AND DIVERSITY-UC BERKELEY, & 
IMMIGRATION LAW CLINIC-UC DAVIS, IN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST?: THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT TO DEPORTATION (Mar. 2010), available at 
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but offers few tangible immigration benefits, enforcement or otherwise. 
Nevertheless, many knowledgeable observers have viewed the immigration 
policies of the Obama administration as leaning heavily toward the enforcement 
end of the policy spectrum.173 While steadily ramping up enforcement, the 
administration has dangled the promise of comprehensive immigration reform, 
with the caveat that such reform can only be accomplished once sufficient 
enforcement has been put into place.174 The result of the failure to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform has been rapidly escalating enforcement 
without any of the benefits of promised reform for immigrants and the U.S. 
citizen members of their families.  
One might ask the entirely logical question of why there has been an increase 
in undocumented immigrants despite the dramatic ramp-up in immigration 
 
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/images/childsbestinterest.pdf; Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme 
Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
491 (1995); Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35 (1988). There are many mixed immigration status families—that is, families 
with members who are U.S. citizens, undocumented immigrants, and lawful immigrants—in the 
United States. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. (Pew Hispanic Center, Mar. 7, 2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61 (stating that a growing number of 
American families are of mixed immigration status where some family members are citizens while 
others are undocumented); see also Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right 
to Know the Immigration Consequences of Pleas Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 48 (2010) (“Mixed 
status families are a fact of life in immigrant communities. Over half of the 16 million Latino children 
in the United States have at least one immigrant parent.”) (footnote omitted). 
 There has been much scholarship in recent years on the subject of families and immigration. 
See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007); 
Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120 (2009); Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Know Your Rights: Conflict of 
Interest and the Assistance of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 263 (2010); 
María Pabón López, A Tale of Two Systems: Analyzing the Treatment of Noncitizen Families in State Family 
Law Systems and Under the Immigration Law System, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 229 (2008); Lori A. 
Nessel, Families at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies Threaten the Immigrant 
Family in the European Union and the United States, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (2008); David B. 
Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 391 (2008); David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as 
Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453 (2008); David B. Thronson, 
Thinking Small: The Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. 
L. & POL’Y 239 (2010). 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 117–18; Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 56 (2010) (criticizing President Obama because, despite pledging to 
reform immigration detention, his administration instead has greatly expanded enforcement efforts); 
Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All?: The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims 
Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 562 (2010) (discussing the current commitment of the Obama 
administration to use stricter interior enforcement and immigration laws); Chacón, supra note 52, at 
1575 (“In spite of vocal commitment to immigration reform, the Obama administration has 
continued to engage in record-setting levels of immigration prosecution.”). 
174. See Peter Slevin, Record Numbers Being Deported; Rise is Part of Obama’s Efforts to Remake 
Immigration Laws, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, at A1. 
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enforcement for more than two decades. Migration to the United States in 
modern times has largely been a labor migration, which has been spurred by the 
increasing globalization of the world economy, as typified by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.175 Previous immigration reforms have unsuccessfully 
attempted to address the magnet of jobs. Most significantly, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986176 imposed civil penalties on the employers of 
undocumented immigrants; at the time of its passage, employer sanctions had 
been championed as marking the beginning of the end of undocumented 
immigration. As the statistics demonstrate, however, employer sanctions simply 
have not been particularly successful at deterring the employment of 
undocumented labor.177 
Intuitively, we all know this truth to be self-evident: the employment of 
undocumented workers continues to be commonplace in restaurants, homes, 
construction sites, agriculture, and manufacturing.178 Day laborer pick-up points, 
with many undocumented immigrants in this pool of workers, can be found on 
street corners in towns and cities across the United States.179 Put simply, the U.S. 
economy relies on undocumented labor.180 
The creation of high tech systems that would allow for the effective 
enforcement of employer sanctions appears to be many years away. Years of 
efforts to create a computer database that accurately verifies the employment 
eligibility of persons—and which could be utilized to enforce IRCA’s prohibition 
of the employment of undocumented immigrants—have yet to yield one with an 
error rate sufficiently low (so as not to incorrectly disqualify excessive numbers of 
lawful workers from employment) to survive legal challenge.181 
 
175. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 1610–17. Perhaps ironically, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement arguably triggered economic changes in Mexico that contributed to increased 
migration. See Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Border: Trade, Labor, Migration, and Agricultural 
Production in Mexico, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 867 (2010). 
176. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
177. For critical analysis of the nation’s failed experience with employer sanctions as a means 
to deter the employment of undocumented immigrants, as well as the negative collateral 
consequences of sanctions, such as discrimination against U.S. citizens and lawful permanent 
residents of certain national origins, see generally Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of 
Sanctions: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1994) (concluding 
that the elimination of employer sanctions is the most expedient way of remedying the increased 
racial discrimination caused by the enforcement of employer sanctions); Huyen Pham, The Private 
Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 780–82 (2008) (analyzing the ineffectiveness of 
employer sanctions and the national origin discrimination against lawful workers resulting from the 
enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment 
Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193 (arguing that the employer sanctions regime has achieved neither of 
its goals of deterring illegal immigration or protecting U.S. labor markets). 
178. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 169–70. 
179. See id. at 174. 
180. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 119–25 (2007). 
181. See Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1313–14 (observing that reform proposals to this point 
have failed to come up with a reliable way to reduce undocumented migration to the United States). 
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Nor, as high level governmental officials have readily admitted, does the U.S. 
government have the resources and commitment necessary to engage in a massive 
campaign, which would cost billions of dollars, to remove nearly eleven to twelve 
million undocumented immigrants from the country—and millions of workers 
from the U.S. economy.182 This nation has never seen mass deportations of this 
scale. Given modern civil rights sensibilities, they simply are not a viable policy 
alternative. 
The proof is in the pudding. Despite record-setting removals, millions of 
undocumented immigrants today live in the United States.183 Even with ever-
increasing interior enforcement and skyrocketing border enforcement budgets, the 
undocumented population has more than doubled since the mid-1990s. 
Enforcement measures, including hundreds of thousands of removals a year and 
the raiding of workplaces,184 although causing much human suffering and misery, 
at most have put nothing more than a small dent in the rapid growth of the 
undocumented population in the United States.185 
This bears repeating: record numbers of deportations year after year, the 
extension of the fence along the United States-Mexico border, dramatically 
increased use of detention, the criminalization, along with heightened prosecution, 
of immigration offenses,186 and vastly expanded enforcement efforts over decades 
have not significantly reduced undocumented immigration. They in fact have been 
accompanied by a dramatic increase in the undocumented immigrant population 
in the United States.  
 
182. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 183–86. 
183. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 211–12 (1984); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1035 (1984); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Div. of Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007); Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 
v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1986); Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and 
Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 307 (2009); Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid 
and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2009); Anna Williams 
Shavers, Welcome to the Jungle: New Immigrants in the Meatpacking and Poultry Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 31 (2009); Cassie L. Peterson, Note, An Iowa Immigration Raid Leads to Unprecedented Criminal 
Consequences: Why ICE Should Rethink the Postville Model, 95 IOWA L. REV. 323 (2009); Abby Sullivan, 
Note, On Thin ICE: Cracking Down on the Racial Profiling of Immigrants and Implementing a Compassionate 
Enforcement Policy, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 101, 101 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“Since 
2006 the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’) has increasingly conducted 
workplace and residence raids as a prominent mechanism for the enforcement of immigration laws.”). 
 The Obama administration has moved away from workplace raids of suspected employers of 
undocumented immigrants, which the Bush administration had increased in number, and engaged in 
“silent raids” of employers through reviewing employee paperwork to identify potential 
undocumented workers. See Julia Preston, Illegal Workers Swept From Jobs in “Silent Raids,” N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2010, at A1; see also Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115 (2009) 
(critically analyzing the impacts of moving immigration enforcement efforts away from the physical 
border of the United States). 
185. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
186. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 178–79. 
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There are collateral impacts of the failure of Congress to pass some kind of 
comprehensive immigration reform. Increased enforcement has been an integral 
part of a political effort to convince Congress to pass comprehensive immigration 
reform.187 Unfortunately, the human consequences of the enforcement of the U.S. 
immigration laws are often ignored in discussing the need for ever-greater 
immigration enforcement. They simply are not at center stage of the debate over 
immigration reform. 
Specifically, the human costs that this Article highlights are: 
(1) the deaths of Latina/os on the United States-Mexico border resulting 
from increased border enforcement; 
(2) human trafficking resulting from increased border enforcement; and 
(3) other significant violations of the civil rights of immigrants and Latina/os 
generally resulting from increased border enforcement. 
All of these costs mean that immigration and immigration enforcement, in my 
estimation, raise some of the most pressing Latina/o civil rights issues of the new 
millennium. 
The failure of immigration reform and continued incentives for 
undocumented immigration will result in continued costs of this type imposed on 
real people. They may not be U.S. citizens, but they are people nonetheless. They 
have certain rights under American and international law. At a bare minimum, the 
nation should fully consider the human costs in deciding whether increased 
immigration enforcement is morally justifiable as well as an efficient use of scarce 
budgetary resources. 
1. Deaths (of Latina/os) on the Border 
At a most fundamental level, more border enforcement has meant more 
deaths of migrants—almost all of them from Mexico and Central America—along 
the United States-Mexico border.188 A rough low-end estimate is that one person a 
day dies a slow and agonizing death on migrant trails in the nation’s southern 
border region.189 
Border enforcement operations, such as Operation Gatekeeper and 
Operation Hold the Line put into place along the United States-Mexico border in 
 
187. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
188. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 111–16; see also Mary D. Fan, When Deterrence and Death 
Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in Border Regulation, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 701 
(2008) (criticizing the increase of border enforcement and its soaring death tolls); Daniel Griswold, 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: What Congress and the President Need to Do to Make It Work, 3 ALB. 
GOV’T L. REV. ix, xiv (2010) (criticizing the “enforcement-only” efforts by the U.S. government that 
have led to three times as many deaths at the U.S.-Mexico border than in the 1990s); Natsu Taylor 
Saito, Border Constructions: Immigration Enforcement and Territorial Presumptions, 10 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 193, 194 (2007) (“Each year hundreds of people die of exposure, thirst, or drowning while 
attempting to cross the border from Mexico.”) (citation omitted). 
189. See infra notes 190–91 (citing authorities).  
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the mid-1990s, have redirected migrants from crossing in urban areas, namely San 
Diego, California, and El Paso, Texas, to more isolated and geographically 
dangerous locations, including the deserts of southern Arizona.190 Despite these 
and other border enforcement operations, migrants in pursuit of jobs and 
economic opportunity continue to hazard the journey to the United States 
through isolated deserts and mountains. Tragically, some die horrible deaths.  
When discussing border enforcement and increased enforcement, 
proponents and opponents tend not to discuss the rising death toll. Ever-
increasing Latina/o deaths unfortunately do not appear to have made much of a 
mark on the national consciousness. 
2. Human Trafficking 
As many commentators have written, the trafficking of human beings across 
international borders for profit has risen dramatically in recent years.191 The 
phenomenon is not limited to the sex industry as the media frequently 
sensationalizes. Rather, human trafficking is a more general labor migration 
problem.192 
Greater enforcement of the United States-Mexico border has resulted in 
dramatic increases in smuggling fees as the U.S. government has increased the 
barriers to entry, with the amount smugglers charge rising from a few hundred 
dollars per migrant in the early 1990s to thousands of dollars per crossing today.193 
 
190. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 112–14; Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy 
and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001); 
Karl Eschbach et al., Death at the Border, 33 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 430 (1999); Bill Ong Hing, The 
Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121 (2001). 
191. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the 
Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2010) (analyzing legal relief for victims of 
trafficking in modern era of increasing immigration enforcement); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and 
Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977 
(2006) (analyzing the prevalent problem of trafficking human beings); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect 
Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 
(2007) (to the same effect); Enrique A. Maciel-Matos, Comment, Beyond the Shackles and Chains of the 
Middle Passage: Human Trafficking Unveiled, 12 SCHOLAR 327 (2010) (analyzing the failures and successes 
of the law’s ability to protect victims of human trafficking); Rebecca L. Wharton, Note, A New 
Paradigm for Human Trafficking: Shifting the Focus from Prostitution to Exploitation in the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 753 (2010) (studying the conflation of prostitution and 
“other” human trafficking). See id. at 755 (Often, “[s]muggling is distinguished from human trafficking 
by several elements, the two most important being a lack of force, fraud, or coercion, and lack of 
exploitation after the person has been transported. Despite these asserted differences, many smuggled 
migrants are exploited, and it is not clear whether they should be classified as victims of human 
trafficking. Smuggled migrants may be forced into debt bondage to pay for the smuggling, or abused 
before, during, or after the illegal entry, so that the exploitative end result is the same.”). For the 
purposes used here, the article employs the terms human trafficking and smuggling interchangeably. 
192. See James Gray Pope, A Free Labor Approach to Human Trafficking, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 
(2010). 
193. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 173. 
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As a result, criminal organizations have entered into the lucrative business of 
human trafficking. Consequently, we have seen increasing reports of indentured 
and involuntary servitude, colloquially known as slavery, as migrants “work off” 
their smuggling debts.194 
3. Civil Rights Impacts on Immigrant and Latina/o Communities 
The current immigration system has contributed to the creation of dual labor 
markets with an accompanying racial caste quality to them.195 One job market is 
comprised of undocumented workers, many of whom are Latina/o, with workers 
often paid less than the minimum wage and enjoying precious few enforceable 
health and safety protections. Professor Leticia Saucedo has aptly dubbed this the 
“brown collar workplace.”196 The other labor market is comprised of U.S. citizens 
and lawful immigrants, with the workers enjoying the full (even if not fully 
enforced) protections of the law. Workers in one market are exploited while those 
in the other market face shrinking job opportunities as employers pursuing 
rational economic ends shift jobs from the “legal” (and more expensive) to the 
“illegal” (and less expensive) labor markets.197 
To many observers, several other aspects of the current U.S. immigration 
laws result in particularly unfair impacts on immigrants,198 especially Latina/os and 
their U.S. citizen family members. Abuses in immigrant detention often make the 
news,199 as do deportations of generally law-abiding long-term residents.200 The 
 
194. See id. at 113–14. 
195. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 129–30. 
196. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Three Theories of Discrimination in the Brown Collar Workplace, 2009 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 345; Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar Workplace: Toward a 
Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447 (2008); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer 
Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 
(2006). 
197. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 121–25. 
198. See Johnson, supra note 117, at 1620–22. 
199. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Two Groups Find Faults in Immigrant Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2009, at A25 (reporting on two reports critical of U.S. government’s detention of immigrants); 
Henry Weinstein, Feds’ Actions “Beyond Cruel.” Immigration Officials Failed to Treat Detainee Who Later Died 
of Cancer, a Judge Says., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at B1 (“In a stinging ruling, a Los Angeles federal 
judge said immigration officials’ alleged decision to withhold a critical medical test and other 
treatment from a detainee who later died of cancer was ‘beyond cruel and unusual’ punishment.”). 
For reports on the excess of detention, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND AT 
RISK: SEXUAL ABUSE AND HARASSMENT IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION (Aug. 25, 
2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/08/25/us-immigration-detainees-risk-sexual-
abuse; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO 
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86789. There also has been much scholarship critical of the expansion 
of immigrant detention in the United States. See, e.g., Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention 
Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 149 (2004); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal 
Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997); 
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary 
Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995); Kalhan, supra note 172 (detailing the growth 
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public regularly hears sad stories of undocumented students, many of whom are 
long-term residents educated at public schools in our K-12 system, who face 
nearly insurmountable barriers to attending public colleges and universities.201  
But the costs are even greater and more divisive than the rising numbers of 
removals and detentions alone might suggest. Racial profiling remains an endemic 
problem in ordinary immigration enforcement.202 This practice, which has a huge 
impact on U.S. citizens as well as lawful immigrants of Mexican and other national 
origin ancestries likely to be subject to profiling, continues to be part and parcel of 
immigration enforcement. 
Unlike racial profiling in ordinary law enforcement, racial profiling in 
immigration enforcement does not appear to be a matter of public concern. There 
does not appear to be much visible effort to eliminate it, or even to consider 
profiling in immigration enforcement to be a civil rights concern. Concerns with a 
potential increase in racial profiling and related civil rights abuses are one reason 
that Arizona’s S.B. 1070 struck a raw nerve with Latina/os, not just in Arizona but 
from coast to coast.203 
Moreover, the rise in hate crimes against Latina/os and immigrants in recent 
years correlates closely to the nation’s ongoing contentious debate over 
immigration and immigration reform. The more spectacular cases include the 
killings of Latino men by rogue youth in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania (not far from 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania, a city that passed a controversial immigration 
ordinance),204 and Patchogue, New York (the site of a local controversy over the 
 
and excessiveness of immigration detention); Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010) (criticizing holding noncitizens in 
prolonged and indefinite custody); Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No 
Problem?: A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571 (2009) (analyzing the custody procedures in 
detention in comparison to due process standards of international law); Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the 
Court’s Order: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
89 (2010) (analyzing the effects of the automatic stay regulation on mandatory detention). See generally 
MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS (2004) (documenting the 
excesses of immigrant detention in the United States); MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION 
LAWS AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX (2002) (to the same effect). 
200. See, e.g., Susan Dominus, The Vendor Disappears, Leaving a Void, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2009, at A20; see also Lori A. Nessel, The Practice of Medical Repatriation: The Privatization of Immigration 
Enforcement and Denial of Human Rights, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1725 (2009) (analyzing trends of the 
deportation of seriously ill or injured (hospitalized) noncitizens). 
201. See, e.g., HELEN THORPE, JUST LIKE US: THE TRUE STORY OF FOUR MEXICAN GIRLS 
COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA (2009); see also note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the 
DREAM Act, which would help ameliorate some of the challenges facing undocumented college 
students). The Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), ruled that a state could not 
effectively deny access to a public K-12 education to undocumented immigrant students. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 83–95. 
203. See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text. 
204. See Lozano v. Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (invalidating most of city 
immigration ordinance on federal preemption grounds), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
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costs of an increasing immigrant population).205 In 2010, police found it necessary 
to respond to a spate of hate crimes directed at Mexican immigrants on Staten 
Island.206 More generally, FBI statistics indicate that hate crimes directed at 
Latina/os—U.S. citizens as well as immigrants—rose a whopping forty percent 
from 2003 to 2007.207 
Racism and xenophobia to some degree often infect the public debate over 
immigration in the United States.208 For that reason, it is not entirely surprising—
and hardly mere coincidence—that hate crimes directed at immigrants and 
Latina/os have increased at the same historical moment as public concern and 
emotion have erupted over immigration and Congress has failed to respond in a 
meaningful way.209 The harsh tone of the debate, replete with references to 
“illegals,” “anchor babies,” and Mexicans, can be nothing less than chilling, 
particularly to immigrants and U.S. citizens of particular national origin ancestries. 
To facilitate meaningful debate over possible reform of the U.S. immigration 
laws, calm, respect, and a commitment to reasonable dialogue and the exchange of 
ideas are critically important.210 Unfortunately, some advocates of restrictionist 
immigration laws and policies often seek to inflame anti-immigrant sentiment to 
build political support for a stringent immigration agenda.211 Restrictionists 
regularly seek to capitalize on public fears—racial, economic, cultural, social, 
environmental, and others—about immigration and immigrants.212 
A glaring example of hyperbole employed by restrictionists is Arizona 
Governor Jan Brewer’s statement that border violence had resulted in the finding 
of headless bodies in the desert, a statement that she later admitted was false.213 A 
fast-and-loose (and, at times, false) characterization of the alleged problems caused 
by immigration and immigrants—such as contending that immigrants are 
 
205. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 611–12. 
206. See Kirk Semple, Young Residents on Staten Island Try to Make Sense of a Spate of Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A23. 
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(Oct. 29, 2008) http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2008/10/29/anti-latino-hate-crimes-rise-for-fourth-
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208. See id. 
209. See supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text. 
210. See Johnson, supra note 16, at 608. 
211. See id. 
212. See id.; see, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, MEXIFORNIA: A STATE OF BECOMING 
(2003); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL 
IDENTITY (2004); MICHELLE MALKIN, INVASION: HOW AMERICA STILL WELCOMES TERRORISTS, 
CRIMINALS, AND OTHER FOREIGN MENACES TO OUR SHORES (2002). Anti-immigrant blogs can be 
even more incendiary. See, e.g., VDARE.com, http://www.vdare.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2010); 
Michelle Malkin, http://michellemalkin.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).  
213. See Paul Davenport & Amanda Lee Myers, Jan Brewer Admits She Was Wrong About 
Beheadings, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/04/jan-
brewer-admits-she-was_0_n_705722.html. 
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primarily responsible for the nation’s crime, drug, fiscal, and national security 
problems—plays into, and reinforces, the oft-made dire claims of an “alien 
invasion” of the United States, a war-like situation in which foreigners are viewed 
as unwanted intruders, if not hostile and dangerous invaders, who restrictionists 
frequently claim deserve immediate, drastic, and almost invariably harsh action.214 
We as a nation ignore at our peril the simple fact that anti-immigrant 
sentiment exists among some segments of the general public, and that it at times 
finds expression in especially virulent ways at the state and local levels.215 The 
racially tinged, anti-Mexican, anti-immigrant campaign culminating in the landslide 
passage of California’s Proposition 187 was nothing less than an anti-immigrant 
landmark.216 Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which combined fiery rhetoric with legitimate 
concerns, is a more recent example.217 Along these lines, Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of 
Maricopa County, Arizona and popularly known as “America’s Toughest Sheriff,” 
has vowed, regardless of its legality, to pursue controversial immigration and other 
law enforcement policies—such as forcing detainees to wear pink underwear—
that regularly draw the ire of the civil rights and immigrant communities.218 In the 
last few years, hate groups have increasingly played on nationalistic slogans and 
anti-immigrant themes.219 
Although arguably less prominent in the national debate over immigration, 
racism almost inexorably animates some of the vociferousness of the debate over 
immigration reform at the national level. Racism also influences national 
immigration law and policy. 
For example, despite its judicial invalidation, Proposition 187, with anti-
Mexican sentiment at its core,220 unquestionably grabbed the attention of the U.S. 
government and shaped more than a decade of enforcement-oriented measures. 
 
214. For critical analysis of the “alien invasion” trope commonly invoked by immigration 
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political agitation and harsh, at times violent, rhetoric in Arizona, the tragic shooting Gabrielle 
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The passage of the measure led to aggressive federal action by the Clinton 
administration to tighten the border. Passage of Proposition 187 also resulted in 
immigration reform legislation221 that limited eligibility for relief from deportation 
for lawful immigrants who had resided in the United States for many years, and 
dramatically increased noncitizen detention and deportation.222 Similar state and 
local political agitation about immigration in recent years also appear to have 
contributed to ever-increasing federal immigration enforcement.223  
With the failure of comprehensive immigration reform, the eruption of 
racism and hate directed at immigrants and Latina/os, as well as the civil rights 
deprivations, will likely continue. This unfortunately is another unstated cost of 
the failure of Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform. 
4. Conclusion 
Put simply, border enforcement has human consequences on the civil rights 
of Latina/o citizens and immigrants, ranging from deaths to human trafficking and 
other violations of rights. Increased enforcement, which apparently will come with 
or without comprehensive immigration reform, increases those consequences. 
Few would dispute that immigration and border enforcement of some kind 
is necessary, if for nothing more than to ensure public safety in the United States. 
However, any proposal for increased enforcement must be carefully scrutinized to 
ensure that its costs—including the human costs—are outweighed by its 
benefits.224 For many, it is difficult to justify the human costs even if the benefits 
outweigh the costs. But it is next to impossible to justify those costs if there are 
little, if any, enforcement benefits. Importantly, the failure of Congress to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform means that the tragic human costs of 
enforcement will continue to mount, with few perceived benefits (other than 
political ones for certain politicians). 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of Congress to pass any form of comprehensive immigration 
reform, as well as the enactment of state and local immigration laws like Arizona’s 
 
221. See supra note 166 (citing laws). For criticism of some of the impacts of the reform 
legislation, see HING, supra note 13. 
222. See JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 150–55, 193. 
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commitment—symbolic more than anything because the measure will unlikely decrease 
undocumented immigration in any meaningful way—to border enforcement. See supra notes 116–17 
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and International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 179 (2005) (calling for the weighing of 
the costs of discriminatory measures taken by U.S. government in its “war on terror” as well as the 
potential security benefits). 
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S.B. 1070, will have disparate racial impacts on Latina/o citizens and noncitizens. 
Knowledge of the disparate impacts among Latina/os, combined with race-neutral 
defenses of increasing immigration enforcement and denial of any racial animus, 
contributes to the passionate, racially polarized debate over immigration reform 
and immigrants that the United States has experienced over more than a decade. 
To fully understand the debate over immigration reform and to rationally weigh 
the possible policy alternatives for reform, we must first acknowledge the racially 
disparate impacts of the operation of the current immigration laws.225 
The maintenance of the immigration status quo results in a myriad of other 
harms as well. The current system results in uncertainty both to immigrants and 
employers in the labor market. Immigrants are uncertain about the availability of 
work and access to legal protections, thereby making them especially vulnerable to 
exploitation, as well as the constant, daily threat of deportation and separation 
from friends, family, and community in the United States.226 In addition, more 
immigration enforcement at its most fundamental level results in increasing 
numbers of deaths and despair for immigrants and their U.S. citizen families, with 
disparate impacts on communities of color inside and outside the United States.227 
As outlined in the Article, a color-blind defense to aggressive immigration 
enforcement measures—as well as similar opposition to comprehensive 
immigration reform—allows the advocates of such positions to claim that they are 
not acting with racial animus. Rather, they assert time and again that the goal is 
not to pursue racist ends, nor to accomplish racially disparate impacts, but merely 
to “enforce the law” and “secure our borders.” However, given the modern 
demographics of immigration, many immigration-oriented enforcement measures 
invariably have clear and unequivocal disparate racial impacts, impacts that 
Latina/os and Asians vehemently resist. Maintenance of the status quo has such 
disparate impacts as well. 
The claim of restrictionists that they only want to “enforce the law” and 
“secure our borders” cannot change the fact that, at a most fundamental level, 
immigration law and its enforcement has disparate racial impacts. Ignoring those 
impacts and attempting to obscure, marginalize, and discredit them through the 
invocation of simplistic, catchy slogans will not make them go away.  
Nor will ignorance of the human costs help move forward the debate over 
immigration or make enforcement any more just or morally right. Indeed, a refusal 
to acknowledge the human costs of immigration enforcement will likely increase 
the passions of those who feel that their calls for racial justice are being ignored. 
This is especially true for Latina/os who continue to fight for full membership in 
American social life. 
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The results of the facially neutral nature of much of the debate over 
immigration can be seen in Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the failure of comprehensive 
immigration reform, both of which, as outlined in this Article, would have racially 
disparate impacts on Latina/os. That race is often buried in the discussion, 
however, does not change the simple fact that racially disparate impacts result 
from maintaining or changing the immigration laws. This is because, in modern 
times, immigration unquestionably touches on race and civil rights. 
In the end, the nation must recognize the disparate racial impacts of the law 
and its maintenance and seek to fashion immigration laws and solutions that 
promote social justice, instead of maintaining, expanding, and reinforcing racial 
injustice in American society. Until the nation takes that important first step, we 
can expect to see the passion and divisiveness of the current immigration debate 
in the United States continue unabated. 
 
  
